This paper proposes to examine Daniel Cohen’s recent attempt to apply virtues to argumentation theory, with special attention given to his explication of how open-mindedness can be regarded as an argumentational or critical virtue. It is argued that his analysis involves a contentious claim about open-mindedness as an epistemic virtue, which generates a tension for agents who are simultaneously...

Open-mindedness is generally regarded as an intellectual virtue because its exercise reliably leads to truth. However, some theorists have argued that openmindedness’s truth-conduciveness is highly contingent, pointing out that it is either not truth-conducive at all under certain scenarios or no better than dogmatism or credulity in others. Given such shaky ties to truth, it would appear that ...

This paper explores how open-mindedness and its exercise can be social in nature. In particular, it argues that an individual regarded as open-minded even though she does not conduct all of the intellectual tasks required by herself; is, delegates some these to her epistemic peers. Thinking about such terms only opens up possibility there are different surprising ways for open-minded, but also ...