Article history: Received 12 December 2007 Available online 24 December 2008 JEL classification: J33 M52 C93

Gaussian Process (GP) has gained much attention in cosmology due to its ability reconstruct cosmological data a model-independent manner. In this study, we compare two methods for GP kernel selection: Approximate Bayesian Computation (ABC) Rejection and nested sampling. We analyze three types of data: cosmic Chronometer (CC), Type Ia Supernovae (SNIa), Gamma Ray Burst (GRB), using five function...

Design and Implementation of Pay for Performance A large, mature and robust economic literature on pay for performance now exists, which provides a useful framework for thinking about pay for performance systems. I use the lessons of the literature to discuss how to design and implement pay for performance in practice. JEL Classification: M52, J33, M12, L81

A 3-day-old baby girl developed septicaemia, meningitis, and necrotising fasciitis due to group A beta-haemolytic streptococcus, type M52, which was also cultured from the mother's cervix. Necrotising fasciitis is a severe infection of the skin and subcutaneous tissues with infarction, necrosis, and sloughing of the affected areas. Early recognition of this condition is essential so that approp...

Bonus Payments and Reference Point Violations We investigate how bonus payments affect satisfaction and performance of managers in a large, multinational company. We find that falling behind a naturally occurring reference point for bonus comparisons reduces satisfaction and subsequent performance. The effects tend to be mitigated if information about one’s relative standing towards the referen...

This paper studies wage setting in a directed search model of multiworker firms facing within-firm equity constraints on wages. The reduce wages, as exploit their monopsony power over existing workers, rendering wages less responsive to productivity doing so. They also give rise time inconsistency the dynamic firm problem, face elastic labor supply short run than long run, making commitment fut...

We consider a principal-agent model with moral hazard where the agent’s knowledge about the performance measure is ambiguous and he is averse towards ambiguity. We show that the principal may optimally provide no incentives or contract only on a subset of all informative performance measures. That is, the Informativeness Principle does not hold in our model. These results stand in stark contras...