Optimal resource allocation by means of the price mechanism is one of the main duties of the economics. Optimum allocation is sometimes realized not through the price mechanism, but via assignment algorithms due to an insufficient number of agents on either side of the exchange. Facing the same problem, the kidney market may be considered as a type of market failure that calls for market design...

Kidney exchange provides a life-saving alternative to long waiting lists for patients in need of a new kidney. Fielded exchanges typically match under utilitarian or near-utilitarian rules; this approach marginalizes certain classes of patients. In this paper, we focus on improving access to kidneys for highly-sensitized, or hard-tomatch, patients. Toward this end, we formally adapt a recently ...

Within the last decade, kidney exchange has become a mainstream paradigm to increase the number of transplants. However, compatible pairs do not participate, and the full benefits from exchange can be realized only if they do. In this paper, we propose a new scheme, incentivizing participation of compatible pairs in exchange via insurance for a future renal failure in the patient. Efficiency an...

Kidney exchange, where needy patients swap incompatible donors with each other, offers a lifesaving alternative to waiting for an organ from the deceased-donor waiting list. Recently, chains— sequences of transplants initiated by an altruistic kidney donor— have shown marked success in practice, yet remain poorly understood. We provide a theoretical analysis of the efficacy of chains in the mos...

Most transplanted kidneys are from cadavers, but there are also substantial numbers of transplants from live donors. Recently, there have started to be kidney exchanges involving two donor-patient pairs such that each donor cannot give a kidney to the intended recipient because of immunological incompatibility, but each patient can receive a kidney from the other donor. Exchanges are also made ...