diagnosis-related group (drg) systems across europe are very heterogeneous, in particular because of different classification variables and algorithms as well as costing methodologies. but, given the challenge of increasing patient mobility within europe, health systems are forced to incorporate a common patient classification language in order to compare and identify similar patients e.g. for ...

background: in 2012, switzerland changed from retrospective to prospective hospital payment based on diagnosis related groups (drgs), following the example of the united states, australia, and germany. as in these countries, the objective of this transition was to motivate hospitals to improve efficiency by making them bear financial risk to some extent.objective: this contribution seeks to fin...

A payoff for a game is partnered if it admits no asymmetric dependencies. We introduce the partnered core of a game without side payments and show that the partnered core of a balanced game is nonempty. The result is a strengthening of Scarf 's Theorem on the nonemptiness of the core of a balanced game without side payments. In addition, it is shown that if there are at most a countable number ...

Systematic variation in patient resource use can be a significant problem for a system based on diagnosis-related groups (DRG's) if this variation is not evenly distributed across hospitals. If certain hospitals routinely treat patients who require more services than average under DRG's, the long-run financial viability of these hospitals will be threatened. In this study, the authors examine w...

background and objectives: informal payment in the health settings is a significant challenge facing the health system, with consequences such as inequity in access to healthcare services, distrust to health care system, and dissatisfied customers. detailed identification of the nature of the problem is perquisite to developing relevant overcoming strategies. given that, this study aimed at pro...

Nearly ten years after the implementation of Medicare's Prospective Payment System (PPS), some of its major impacts remain hard to explain using existing economic models. We develop a simple model of the hospital's choice of intensity of care, which affects demand for admissions. The model suggests an important role for the level of prospective payment, independent of the effect of marginal inc...