Millard J. Erickson is the Distinguished Professor of Theology at George W. Truett Theological Seminary, Baylor University. In addition to teaching at a number of institutions during his career, Dr. Erickson also served as the Vice President and Dean at Bethel Theological Seminary. He is the author of numerous books and articles, including the recently published Making Sense of the Trinity (Bak...

I provide a construal of the epistemic regress problem and I take issue with the contention that a foundationalist solution is incompatible with an internalist account of warrant. I sketch a foundationalist solution to the regress problem that respects a plausible version of internalism. I end with the suggestion that the strategy that I have presented is not available only to the traditional v...

Finitism, intuitionism, constructivism, formalism, predicativism, structuralism, objectivism, platonism; foundationalism, anti-foundationalism, first orderism; constructive type theory, Cantorian set theory, proof theory; top down principles or building up from below—framework commitments, that is, ideology, permeates the logician’s mathematical life. Such commitments set ∗This paper is based o...

281 ing of justifi cation is, in my terms, that (1) the epistemologist has to choose between (a) mind-internalist foundationalism (e.g., evidentialism), (b) mind-externalist foundationalism (e.g., process reliabilism), and (c) mind-internalist coherentism (e.g., simple coherentism), and (2) objections such as the Alternative-Systems Objection and the Isolation Objection dictate against choosing...

Epistemic Structure of Islamic Philosophies of Education: Foundationalism or Coherentism M.R. Madanifar N. Sajjaadiyeh, Ph.D. Given the two approaches to epistemology emphasizing foundationalism or coherentism, it is of interest to know if the epistemic structure of Islamic philosophies of education is related to any of these two or has a structure of its own, given that each...

Infinitists argue that their view outshines foundationalism because infinitism can, whereas foundationalism cannot, explain two of epistemic justification’s crucial features: it comes in degrees and it can be complete. I present four different ways that foundationalists could make sense of those two features of justification, thereby undermining the case for infinitism.

The traditional debate over skepticism has largely presupposed the framework of foundationalism. With the rise of the intemalism/externalism debate in epistemology, however, it is apparent that there are radically different ways to understand foundational justification. In this chapter we begin by examining the traditional epistemic regress argument for foundationalism. Before presenting what I...

Post-foundationalism as a theoretical perspective in the social sciences is based on epistemological assumption that world, no ultimate foundation exists. This volume aims to promote post-foundationalism and its relevance for geography, particularly urban studies. To achieve aim, it presents 15 thematic chapters structured across three parts, well […]