This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a di®erentiated duopoly with R&D (research and development) competition. Cournot competition is shown to induce more R&D e®ort than Bertrand competition. However, the price is lower and output is higher in Bertrand than in Cournot competition. Furthermore, the Bertrand equilibrium is more e±cient than the Cournot equilibrium if either R&D p...

We investigate the welfare effect of union activity in a relatively new oligopoly model, the Cournot-Bertrand model, where one firm competes in output (a la Cournot) and the other firm competes in price (a la Bertrand). The Nash equilibrium prices, outputs, and profits are quite diverse in this model, with the competitive advantage going to the Cournot-type competitor. A comparison of the resul...

This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with R6D (research and development) competition. It shows that Cournot competition induces more R6D effort than Bertrand competition. However, the price is lower and output is larger in Bertrand than in Cournot competition. Furthermore, the Bertrand equilibrium is more efficient than the Cournot equilibrium if eithe...

Comparing Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria Revisited by Jim Y. Jin This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria with mixed products, linear demand and cost functions. It is found that a firm's price (output) need not be higher (lower) in Cournot equilibrium. However, given any number of firms and a mixture of complement and substitute products, every firm's price margin/output ratio is al...

Incentives and Welfare Effect of Sharing Firm-Specific Information by Jim Y. Jin* This paper studies the incentives and the welfare effect of sharing firm-specific information in asymmetric Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly with mixed substitute and complement goods. Revealing firm-specific cost information is the dominant strategy in Cournot oligopoly, while concealing is so in Bertrand oligopoly...

In this paper, we study three prototypical models of noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders: the model of Cournot-Walras equilibrium of Codognato and Gabszewicz (1991), the model of Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Lloyd S. Shapley, and the model of Cournot-Walras equilibrium of Busetto et al. (2008). We argue that these models are all distinct and only the Shapley’s model w...

This paper provides a simple model of endogenous horizontal product differentiation that has two important implications. First, the model can explain the “empirical Bertrand paradox” – the failure to observe homogeneous product Bertrand oligopoly. If product differentiation is possible at reasonable cost, then Bertrand firms would always invest in product differentiation. Using a quadratic util...

We consider a Cournot oligopoly model where multiple suppliers (oligopolists) compete by choosing quantities. We compare the social welfare achieved at a Cournot equilibrium to the maximum possible, for the case where the inverse market demand function is convex. We establish a lower bound on the efficiency of Cournot equilibria in terms of a scalar parameter derived from the inverse demand fun...

It is known that a Lindahl equilibrium is not necessarily Pareto-superior to the non-cooperative Cournot-Nash outcome. This paper derives conditions under which the Lindahl Paretodominates the Cournot-Nash solution. We show that all are better off in the Lindahl equilibrium as compared to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium when the exogenously given income distribution is not skewed too much or the n...

We give an efficient algorithm for computing a Cournot equilibrium when the producers are confined to integers, the inverse demand function is linear, and costs are quadratic. The method also establishes existence constructively. We use our characterization to discuss the multiplicity of integer Cournot equilibria and their relationship to the real Cournot equilibrium.