We examine the contractual implications of a lender’s trust for corporate loans. measure how trusting lender is using average attitude in chief executive officer’s ancestral country origin. find that banks with CEOs charge lower interest rates U.S. syndicated This effect identified within existing lender–borrower relationships and similar types Further analyses indicate reduces cost credit by b...

We examine the effects of changes in competitive conditions on the structure of loan contracts. In particular, we present conditions in which greater loan market competition reduces the stringency of contractual collateral requirements, a prediction that is consistent with anecdotal evidence from loan markets. We also analyze the interaction between the degree of competition and the efficiency ...

We document some recent changes in the market for loan sales. We use a Tobit model to characterize the determinants of loan sales and purchases by banks, relating quantities bought and sold to bank size, capital, risk, and fbnding mode. The results, though not definitive, broadly confirm the Pennacchi model of sales. Other data cast doubt on the importance of mergers and acquisitions for this m...

Article history: Received 7 August 2014 Received in revised form 20 June 2015 Accepted 29 June 2015 Available online 9 July 2015 This study investigates whether a firm with strong corporate governance (CG) requires political connections (PCs), that is, we examine whether CG and PC substitute for or complement each other. Using 71,069 individual bank loan contracts from Taiwan, we examine how lo...

Objective: The variables of customer concentration and bank loan contracts can affect corporate finance activities, and customer concentration may increase corporate returns. Methods: Under this study, the relationship between customer concentration and bank loan contracts have been investigated first and then the moderating effect of financial status variables and accounts payable on relation...

We analyze lending contracts when social sanctions are used to enforce repayments and borrowers di¤er in their unobserved sanctioning abilities. Symmetric group loans are preferred to cosigned loans when borrowers are relatively equal, and cosigned loans are preferred when borrowers are unequal. This explains why microlenders that target the poor (e.g., the Grameen Bank) use symmetric group loa...