Article history: Received 9 January 2009 Available online 15 May 2010 JEL classification: C79 D82

Article history: Received 17 December 2016 Available online 10 July 2017 JEL classification: C72 C79 D82 D83

We give examples of strategic interaction which are beneficial for players who follow a "middle path" of balance between pure selfishness and pure altruism. JEL Classification: C70, C71, C72, C79.

We consider “social contracts” which alter the payoffs of players in a noncoperative game, generating new Nash Equilibria (NE). In the domain of contracts which — in conjunction with their concomitant NE — are “self-financing”, our focus is on those that are (Pareto) optimal. By way of a key example, we examine optimal levels of crime and punishment in a population equilibrium. JEL Classificati...

We consider the priority-based allocation problem: there is a set of indivisible objects with multiple supplies (e.g., schools with seats) and a set of agents (e.g., students) with priorities over objects (e.g., proximity of residence area). We study two well-known and competing mechanisms. The agentoptimal stable mechanism (AOSM) allots objects via the deferred acceptance algorithm. The top tr...

We present experimental results on the ultimatum bargaining game which support an evolutionary explanation of subjects’ behaviour in the game. In these experiments subjects interacted with each other and also with virtual players, i.e. computer programs with prespecified strategies. Some of these virtual players were designed to play the equitable allocation, while others exhibited behaviour cl...

This paper proposes differentiability properties for positively homogeneous risk measures which ensure that the gradient can be applied for reasonable risk capital allocation on non-trivial portfolios. It is shown that these properties are fulfilled for a wide class of coherent risk measures based on the mean and the one-sided moments of a risky payoff. In contrast to quantile-based risk measur...

We study a global game in which actions are strategic complements over some region and strategic substitutes over another region. An agent’s payoff depends on a market fundamental and the actions of other agents. If the degree of congestion is sufficiently large, agents’ strategies are non-monotonic in their signal about the market fundamental. In this case, a signal that makes them believe tha...

We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information. In the robust version, the seller faces model uncertainty and only knows that the true demand distribution is in the neighborhood of a given model distribution. We characterize the pricing policies under two distinct decision criteria with multiple priors: (i) maximin utility and (ii) mi...

credence goods market is one of the markets that the asymmetric information has transformed it to a missing market. those goods and services that the applicant cannot determine the exact amount of their expenses due to the asymmetric information are called credence goods. from the economists' perspective, transaction in a market where participants are ignorant about each other is a game wi...