According to international law, anonymity of the voter is a fundamental precondition for democratic elections. In electronic voting, several aspects of voter anonymity have been identified. In this paper, we re-examine anonymity with respect to voting, and generalise existing notions of anonymity in e-voting. First, we identify and categorise the types of attack that can be a threat to anonymit...

We present a voter verifiable Internet voting scheme which provides anonymity and eliminates the danger of vote selling even if the computer used by the voter cannot be fully trusted. The ballots cast remain anonymous even the machine does not know the choice of the voter. It makes no sense to buy votes the voter can cheat the buyer even if his machine cooperates with the buyer. Nevertheless, t...

Voter anonymity, also known as unlinkability, is the basic requirement in order to satisfy privacy in electronic voting (e-voting) protocols, which means that a particular vote is not linkable to any voter. In other words, the relationship between voter identity and the related cast vote should be private to that particular voter and it should not be revealed or proved in any way. Many e-voting...

Despite the massive improvements in technology the goal of having accurate, anonymous and voter-verifiable elections has not yet been realized. The existing electronic voting schemes that provide secret voter-verifiable receipts are based on ‘classical’ mix-nets. These mix-nets approaches do not scale well and are designed to provide a fixed degree of anonymity which cannot be increased by the ...

Electronic voting (E-voting) using an internet has been recently performed in some nations and regions. There is no spatial restriction which a voter directly has to visit the polling place, but an e-voting using an internet has to go together the computer in which the internet connection is possible. Also, this voting requires an access code for the e-voting through the beforehand report of a ...

Anonymity and verifiability are crucial security requirements for voting. Still, they seem to be contradictory, and confusion exists about their precise meanings and compatibility. In this paper, we resolve the confusion by showing that both can be expressed in terms of (un)linkability: while anonymity requires unlinkability of voter and vote, verifiability requires linkability of voters and el...

We study one of the many aspects of privacy, which is referred to as data anonymity, in a formal context. Data anonymity expresses whether some piece of observed data, such as a vote, can be attributed to a user, in this case a voter. We validate the formal treatment of data anonymity by analyzing a well-known electronic voting protocol.

In recent years, a large number of secure voting protocols have been proposed in the literature. Often these protocols contain flaws, but because they are complex protocols, rigorous formal analysis has proven hard to come by. Rivest’s ThreeBallot voting system is important because it aims to provide security (voter anonymity and voter verifiability) without requiring cryptography. In this pape...

Electronic Transactions over the Internet, particularly using the World Wide Web have become an integral part of economic life. Recently also the public sector has started to use the new medium for its administrative processes. This paper analyses several approaches to implement an electronic voting system and discusses them with a view to voter anonymity and protection from manipulations. The ...

Audit logs are an important tool for post-election investigations, in the event of an election dispute or problem. We propose a new approach to logging that is designed to provide a record of all interactions between each voter and the voting machine. Our audit logs provide a comprehensive, trustworthy, replayable record of essentially everything the voter saw and did in the voting booth, provi...