the distinction between primitive predication and common predication is applied to solve some problems in islamic philosophy, some of which are incorrect in our point of view. some of the problems contain paradoxes and some others include independent philosophical discussions: 1. stating about absolute non-existents, 2. problems of subjective existence, 3. liar paradox and russell’s paradox, 4....

Can we solve the Liar paradox by simply declaring Liar sentences to be false? That is the proposal of Dale Jacquette in (Jacquette, 2007). The Liar paradox arises because apparently we can derive a contradiction from the assumption that the Liar sentence is true, and we can also derive a contradiction from the assumption that it is false. Jacquette argues that the former reasoning (i.e., the de...

This essay delivers a serious message on life, at the core of reasoning, to wit, “I am a liar” selfdestructive infests reasoning to undermine it to fill life with oxymora, then proposes a singing way out in music. This essay is naturally divided into three sections: one, how self-destructive the liar paradox is life-ubiquitous; two, the liar paradox as basic to logic and philosophy; and three, ...

This is a defense and extension of Stephen Yablo’s claim that self-reference is completely inessential to the liar paradox. An infinite sequence of sentences of the form “None of these subsequent sentences are true” generates the same instability in assigning truth values. I argue Yablo’s technique of substituting infinity for self-reference applies to all so-called “self-referential” paradoxes...

Kripke’s solution to the Liar Paradox and other paradoxes of truth (1975) is generalized to the paradoxes of denotation. Berry’s Paradox and Hilbert and Bernays’ Paradox are treated in detail.

I. A Methodological Turnaround. Confronting the Liar Paradox is commonly viewed as a prerequisite for developing a theory of truth. As soon as the truth theorist accepts one of the most minimal principles of truth, the equivalence principle, which in one of its forms is often formulated (schematically) by (E) is true iff (if and only if) P, where “P” stands for any sentence and “” stands...

John Barker, in two recent essays, raises a variety of intriguing criticisms to challenge my interpretation of the liar paradox and the type of solution I propose in ‘Denying the Liar’ and ‘Denying the Liar Reaffirmed.’ Barker continues to believe that I have misunderstood the logical structure of the liar sentence and its expression, and that as a result my solution misfires. I shall try to sh...

Recently, several philosophers have proposed fictionalist accounts of truthtalk, as a means for resolving the semantic pathology that the Liar Paradox appears to present. These alethic fictionalists aim to vindicate truth-talk as a kind of as if discourse, while rejecting that the talk attributes any real property of truth. Liggins (Analysis 74:566–574, 2014) has recently critically assessed on...