This introduces the symposium on financial economics. JEL Classification Codes: G01, G02, G11, G12, G18, G21, G23, G28

Abstract We derive three testable predictions from a bank-P2P lender model of competition: (a) P2P lending grows when some banks are faced with exogenously higher regulatory costs; (b) loans riskier than bank loans; and (c) the risk-adjusted interest rates on lower those loans. test these against data consumer credit market in Germany find empirical support. Overall, our analysis indicates that...

We examine the dynamic effects of TFP news shocks in context frictions financial markets. document two new facts. First, a shock to future generates significant decline credit spread indicators along with robust improvement supply indicators. Second, we establish tight link between and that explain majority un-forecastable movements A DSGE model enriched sector Gertler-Kiyotaki-Karadi type very...

After the Great Recession several central banks started setting negative nominal interest rates in an expansionary attempt, but effectiveness of this measure remains unclear. Negative can stimulate economy by lowering that commercial charge on loans, they also erode bank profitability squeezing deposit spreads. This paper studies effects a new DSGE model where intermediate transmission monetary...

Custodians play a key but discrete role in the global financial market infrastructure. In Europe, they are licensed as “credit institutions ”, legal requirement for European deposit-taking institutions, and therefore face same prudential requirements “traditional” banks. However, their business model risk profile different from those of traditional banks since core activity does not encompass b...

U.S. commercial banks are increasingly using credit scoring models to underwrite small business credits. This paper discusses this technology, evaluates the research findings on the effects of this technology on small business credit availability, and links these findings to a number of research and public policy issues. JEL classification: G21, G28, G34, L23

This note shows that oligopolistic loan competition with discriminatory pricing is inefficient when competing banks differ in their ability to screen borrowers: banks with better screening abilities win too small market shares. This result contrasts with a finding by Spence (1976) who showed that an oligopoly with price discrimination achieves first–best efficiency. JEL classification: D43; D82...

We study the relationship between banks’ size and risk-taking in context of supranational banking supervision. Consistently with theoretical work on unions contrast to analyses emphasising incentives underpinned by too-big-to-fail effect, we find an inverse non-performing loan growth for a sample European banks. Evidence is provided that mechanism operates through enhanced organisational effici...