We argue that with interdependent utility functions growth can lead to a decline in total welfare of a society if the gains from growth are sufficiently unequally distributed in the presence of negative externalities, i.e., envy. JEL Code: D62, D63, D64, O00.

How does gender composition influence team decisions? Our evidence from a group dictator game is: (i) groups are more generous and equalitarian when women are in majority, but (ii) the most generous groups are those with two men and one woman. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: A13; C92; D63; D64; J16

Autocratic regimes, democratic majorities, private platforms, and religious or professional organizations can achieve social control by managing the flow of information about individuals’ behavior. Bundling agents’ political, organizational, attitudes with their prosocial conduct makes them care behaviors that they otherwise would not. The incorporation graph in score further promotes soft but ...

We document a decline in the frequency of shopping trips United States since 1980 and consider its implications for measurement consumption inequality. A as households stock up on storable goods (i.e., inventory behavior) will lead to rise expenditure inequality when latter is measured at high frequency, even underlying unchanged. find that most recently documented 1980s can be accounted by thi...

We test whether altruism is a significant confound of observed choices in the standard trust game. We allow for rich and poor trustees and examine whether, consistent with dominant altruism, trustors give more to the poor, or whether, consistent with dominant trust motives, trustors give no more to the poor than to the rich. This test is based on within-treatment and within-subject comparisons....

In experimental games, we observe the following phenomena: (1) many subjects cooperate contrary to their material interest, (2) they cooperate in a reciprocal manner, (3) subjects often punish those others who behave unkindly, and (4) previous history usually influences subjects’ choices. We propose a simple game-theoretical model to account for these and other experimental phenomena, and compa...

Public recognition is frequently used to motivate desirable behavior, yet its welfare effects—such as costs of shame or gains from pride— are rarely measured. We develop a portable empirical methodology for measuring and monetizing social image utility, we deploy it in experiments on exercise charitable behavior. In all experiments, public motivates behavior but creates highly unequal payoffs. ...

We use variation in weather to study the long-term effects of activism during original Earth Day on attitudes, environmental outcomes, and children’s health. Unusually bad April 22, 1970 is associated with weaker support for environment 10 20 years later, particularly among those who were school aged 1970. Bad also higher levels carbon monoxide air greater risk congenital abnormalities infants ...

We examine experimentally how a person’s generosity depends on the degree of anonymity between giver and recipient, as well as on the parties’ sexes. Less is given when the giver is paid on stage rather than in private; men receive less than women; fewer men than women give non-zero amounts. The results suggest that it may be problematic to organize experimental data in terms of social distance...

Our research is a variant of the third party punishment game. In particular, we want to test whether players have heterogeneous preferences; the levels of the sanction and of the transfer are proportional to the unfairness of the Dictator; the change of the role influences the Observer’s reaction to unfair behavior; players’ decision to punish the Dictator and/or to help the Receiver depends on...