Article history: Accepted 19 December 2013 Available online xxxx JEL classification: L1 D4 C7

Article history: Received 25 November 2008 Revised 23 May 2009 Available online 11 June 2009 JEL classification: D1 D4 L1

A monopolist supplies a multi-attribute good and does not know whether the consumer makes or avoids tradeoffs between attributes. We illustrate a form of exploitation to which the tradeoff-avoiding consumer is vulnerable. (JEL: D6, D8, L1, L2)

The present paper thoroughly explores second-best efficient allocations in an adverse selection insurance economy. We start from a natural extension of the classical model, assuming less than perfect risk perceptions. We propose first and second welfare theorems, by means of which we describe efficiencyenhancing policies. Notions of weak and strong adverse selection are promising for interpreti...

An identity links the rate of economic growth, the speed of poverty reduction and changes in the distribution of income during some time period in a given country. A few authors used that identity to understand the causes for observed changes in poverty and to identify the exact role of economic growth in poverty reduction. Yet, many empirical cross-country studies of the relationship between g...

This paper presents structural estimates of bidding behavior in eBay computer monitor auctions. We use our estimates to reject the use of Jump Bidding (Avery 1998) or “Snipe or War” bidding (Roth and Ockenfels, 2000). We also find that longer auctions only have a small effect on price and experienced auctioneers respond to this incentive. JEL Classification Numbers: C1, C7, D44, L1.