Article history: Received 8 February 2010 Available online 11 February 2010 JEL classification: D50 D51 D53 D61 E40 E50 E51 E52 E58

This paper sets up a matching (decentralized trade) model with a technology that allows each pair of agents to report the transfer of goods in the end of each pairwise meeting. It examines (a) conditions under which an allocation that can be supported as an equilibrium allocation, and (b) whether the report system can replace money. JEL Classification: E40

We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a Markov subgame perfect e-equilibrium, for each e40: This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established. r 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. J...

This paper contributes to the micro-foundation of money in centralized markets with idiosyncratic uncertainty. It shows existence of stationary monetary equilibria and ensures that there is an optimum quantity of money. The rational solution of our model is compared with actual behavior in a laboratory experiment. The experiment gives support to the theoretical approach. JEL classification: C73...

In an economy with commodity-pairwise trading posts and transaction costs, commodity money is endogenously determined in general equilibrium. Absent double coincidence of wants, the lowtransaction cost commodity (with the narrowest proportional bid/ask price spread) becomes the common medium of exchange. JEL Classification: C62, E40

In the present paper, the issue of the existence of optimal barter steady states is addressed in a stationary overlapping generations model with many commodities and many different long-lived consumers. A general characterization of the individual endowments leading to an optimal barter steady state is obtained. The result, which is a generalization of Benveniste and Cass (1986), is obtained as...