The Bretton Woods institutions have systems of governance based on weighted voting. Each member possesses a number of votes which depends on its quota allocation and which must be cast as a bloc. This leads to a problem of democratic legitimacy since a member's influence or voting power within such decision making systems does not in general correspond to its voting weight. This paper uses voti...

Abstract The Goods and Services Tax (GST) Council of India has a non-conventional weighted voting procedure having primary player who is blocker set secondary players. weights are not fixed determined based on the subset players which participate in voting. We introduce notion schema to formally model such procedure. Individual games arise from depending make detailed formal study trade-off bet...

Respecting minority opinions is vital in solving social problems. However, are often ignored general majority rules. To build consensus on pluralistic values and make choices that consider opinions, we propose aggregation methods give weighting to the minority's positionality cardinal cumulative voting. Based quadratic linear voting, formulated three weighted differ ratio of votes points all me...

This paper proposes a new negotiation game, based on the weighted voting paradigm in cooperative game theory, where agents need to form coalitions and agree on how to share the gains. Despite the prevalence of weighted voting in the real world, there has been little work studying people’s behavior in such settings. We show that solution concepts from cooperative game theory (in particular, an e...

In cases where legislators represent districts that vary in population , the design of fair legislative voting rules requires an understanding of how the number of votes cast by a legislator is related to a measure of her influence over collective decisions. We provide three new characterizations of weighted voting, each based on the intuition that winning coalitions should be close to one anot...

We will analyze indirect weighted voting systems as the Council of the European Union and examine fair distributions of voting weights for the delegates, representing voting bodies of size n1, . . . , nm, applying a mixed fairness model. We will see that using a specific quota jointly with mixed voting weights yields a concordance of voting powers and voting weights. We will prove this result a...

In cooperative games, players have a possibility to form different coalitions. This leads the questions about ways motivate all collaborate, i.e. so-called grand coalition. One of such is captured by concept nucleolus, which dates back Babylonian Talmud. Weighted voting games class that are often used model decision making processes in parliaments. this paper, we provide an algorithm for comput...