This paper examines the relationship between corporate valuations and the presence, size, incentives, and identity of multiple large shareholders. Using data on a large number of firms across Western Europe, we find that about one-third of all firms, and over 40 percent of firms with one large owner, have two or more owners that each holds more than 10 percent of the voting rights. We find that...

This research focuses on who controls shareholder’s wealth maximization and how does this affect firm’s performance in publicly quoted non-financial companies in Nigeria. The shareholder fund was the dependent while explanatory variables were firm size (proxied by log of turnover), retained earning (representing management control) and dividend payment (representing measure of shareholders cont...

In this paper, we depict and analyze simple models of moral hazard, namely “operating moral hazard” and “investing moral hazard.” First we assume that a corporation exists primarily for the benefit of their shareholders. Then, moral hazard occurs when managers choose an option knowingly that is not optimum for shareholders. We evaluate the loss to shareholders in terms of cash flow to them in t...

This Article explores the creation and conundrum of citizen shareholders—investors who enter the securities market primarily through employersponsored defined-contribution plans, invest in mutual or index funds, and are saving for long-term goals like retirement. Citizen shareholders are a consequence of a retirement revolution, and are the fastest growing group

Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and discussion only. It may not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working papers are available from the author. Abstract. We use an important legal event as a natural experiment to examine the effect of management fiduciary duties on equity‐debt conflicts. A 1991 Delawar...