David Chalmers (2010) argues for an acquaintance theory of the justification of direct phenomenal beliefs. A central part of this defense is the claim that direct phenomenal beliefs are cognitively significant. I argue against this. Direct phenomenal beliefs are justified within the specious present, and yet the resources available with the present ‘now’ are so impoverished that it barely const...

Ned Block (2002) claims that there is “an epistemic tension” between two fairly widely held commitments: to phenomenal realism and to naturalism. Phenomenal realism is the view that (a) we are phenomenally consciousness, and that (b) there is no a priori or armchair sufficient condition for phenomenal consciousness that can be stated (noncircularly) in nonphenomenal terms (p.392). Block points ...

Every Science has a philosophy in its background and every computation has a natural phenomenon in it’s background. One of the most pronounced research domains in the recent times is study of consciousness, what we have chosen as our area of research. This field of research conglomerates both philosophy and phenomenology. Philosophy of consciousness helped to derive the scientific interpretatio...

In this paper, I raise an objection to Philip Goff’s “Revelation Thesis” as articulated in his Consciousness and Fundamental Reality. Sect. 1 present the Revelation Thesis context of broader defence pan-psychism. 2 argue that entails identity indiscriminable phenomenal properties. 3 properties is false. The upshot

If representationism is true, phenomenal precision is given by representational precision. But what if representationism is false as I claim? Can we make sense of phenomenal precision? Fink argues that there is a danger of trivialization of phenomenal precision and that the one way out may be incompatible with my view that consciousness overflows cognition. I try to say more about how to clarif...