Abstract Although many find it hard to believe that every physical thing—no matter how simple or small—involves some form of consciousness, panpsychists offer the reassurance their claims are perfectly compatible with everything physics has say about world. This is because although a lot causal and structural properties nothing intrinsic natures things, if silent in this regard possible an expe...

Abstract Phenomenology is concerned with the first-person experience of or about some object, and generally related to sensory experience, for example, auditory visual. Cognitive phenomenology refers an element phenomenological that does not have a character. Experiences thought, understanding, appreciation meaning are less figurative than kind therefore suggest treatment separate from experien...

On a natural description of what a mundane visual experience is like for its subject—of its phenomenal character, of how it is phenomenally—such an experience is phenomenally a direct or immediate awareness of entities in the scene before the subject’s eyes. For example, according to Strawson (1979, 97), “mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as [ . . . ] an immediate consciou...

We all know by now that the totality of what is conveyed by a linguistic utterance includes multiple types or categories of content. The categories are distinguished in two main ways: how they arise (e.g. due to linguistic convention or due to normbased inference); and how particular contents of that category behave (e.g. whether the content can embed under operators). The principal types of co...

If languages could lexicalize arbitrary truth tables as sentential connectives, we should be able to find a great variety of connectives in the world’s languages. However, very few connectives are typologically attested, as has long been known. For example, no known language lexicalizes if-and-only-if, not-and, or McCawley (1972)’s schmor, a connective that returns true exactly when two or more...

Purpose. This article discusses researching the nature and basic structure of acts empathy. Such research first requires answering question: are empathic intentional our consciousness? If answer to this question is affirmative, then there a need following questions: what features empathy as ones? And can such be qualified opening special complex type access (epistemic, social, ethical) "other m...

Volume 1 left off. In the years immediately following World War II, logical positivism was drawing its last breaths, and new approaches to philosophy were gathering steam. In America, Quine was attempting to strip positivism of two of its cherished doctrines—the analytic/synthetic distinction, and the verificationist analysis of individual sentences—while rehabilitating its commitments to the c...

1993. McDermott, Michael. "Redundant Causation." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (1995): 523-544. Mellor, D. H. The Facts of Causation. London: Routledge, 1995. Mellor, D. H. "Fixed Past, Unfixed Future." In Contributions to Philosophy: Michael Dummett, edited by Barry Taylor, 166-186. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1986. Menzies, Peter. "Probabilistic Causation and Causal Processes: A Cr...

A perceptual experience of a given object seems to make the object itself present to the perceiver’s mind. As P. F. Strawson says, ‘‘mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as, in Kantian phrase, an immediate consciousness of the existence of things outside us’’ (1979, 47). This phenomenological directness of perceptual experience is the distinctive feature of perceptual phenome...