Standard equilibrium concepts in game theory find it diffi cult to explain the empirical evidence in a large number of static games such as prisoners’ dilemma, voting, public goods, oligopoly, etc. Under uncertainty about what others will do in one-shot games of complete and incomplete information, evidence suggests that people often use evidential reasoning (ER), i.e., they assign diagnostic s...

In many countries, exports are highly concentrated among a few “superstar” firms. We estimate the export decisions of superstar firms as result complete information, simultaneous, discrete choice, static entry game. employ dataset on universe Danish trade transactions by firm, product and destination. also obtain detailed information applied, preferential tariff protection from MAcMap-HS6 datab...

Standard equilibrium concepts in game theory find it diffi cult to explain the empirical evidence for a large number of static games such as prisoner’s dilemma, voting, public goods, oligopoly, etc. Under uncertainty about what others will do in one-shot games of complete and incomplete information, evidence suggests that people often use evidential reasoning (ER), i.e., they assign diagnostic ...

When we were being read fairy tails growing up, we first learned about games of “Complete information”. So the story goes, in such games, all n players know one another’s types, and use this information to somehow select and play one of the (possibly many) Nash equilibria of the game. To recap, a game G (here we will use costs rather than utilities, but it doesn’t matter) is defined by a set of...

Recent price-of-anarchy analyses of games of complete information suggest that coarse correlated equilibria, which characterize outcomes resulting from no-regret learning dynamics, have near-optimal welfare. This work provides two main technical results that lift this conclusion to games of incomplete information, a.k.a., Bayesian games. First, near-optimal welfare in Bayesian games follows dir...

Recent price-of-anarchy analyses of games of complete information suggest that coarse correlated equilibria, which characterize outcomes resulting from no-regret learning dynamics, have near-optimal welfare. This work provides two main technical results that lift this conclusion to games of incomplete information, a.k.a., Bayesian games. First, near-optimal welfare in Bayesian games follows dir...

This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with direct exter-nalities between principals both under complete and asymmetric information. Direct externalities arise when the contracting variable of one principal affects directly the other principal’s payoff. Out-ofequilibrium messages are used by principals to precommit themselves to distort their strategic ...

We present a new model of incomplete information games without private information in which the players use a distributionally robust optimization approach to cope with the payoff uncertainty. With some specific restrictions, we show that our “Distributionally Robust Game” constitutes a true generalization of three popular finite games. These are the Complete Information Games, Bayesian Games a...