The 2010 German 4G spectrum auction was an unusually large simultaneous ascending multi-band auction. The bidding was competitive, the final assignment was efficient and the revenue was close to expectations. However, our analysis suggests that, theoretically, independent and rational bidders had an opportunity to implicitly coordinate on a low-revenue outcome. Yet, the same analysis suggests t...

We propose an Euclidean embedding image representation, which serves to rank auction item images through wide range of semantic similarity spectrum, in the order of the relevance to the given query image much more effective than the baseline method in terms of a graded relevance measure. Our method uses three stream deep convolutional siamese networks to learn a distance metric and we leverage ...

In a first-price auction, asymmetries among bidders typically result in inefficient allocations— that is, the winner of the auction may not be the person who values the object the most. This inefficiency creates a motive for post-auction resale, and when bidders take resale possibilities into account, their bidding behavior is affected as well. Standard models of such auctions, by and large, im...

Motivated by allocation of cloud computing services, bandwidth and wireless spectrum in secondary network markets, we introduce a hierarchical auction model for network resource allocation. The Tier 1 provider owns all of the resource, who holds an auction in which the Tier 2 providers participate. Each of the Tier 2 providers then holds an auction to allocate the acquired resource among the Ti...

We consider important design issues of the reverse auction, a key and innovative part of the FCC’s Incentive Auction. In the reverse auction, broadcasters compete to repurpose television broadcast spectrum for mobile broadband use. The Comment Public Notice (FCC 14-191) outlined the basic structure of the reverse auction. We take that basic structure as given and then examine critical elements ...

We consider important design issues of the reverse auction, a key and innovative part of the broadcast television incentive auction. In the reverse auction, broadcasters compete to repurpose television broadcast spectrum for mobile broadband use. The Comment Public Notice (FCC 14 191) outlined the basic structure of the reverse auction. We take that basic structure as given and then examine cri...

I this paper we present a new improved design for multiobject auctions and report on the results of experimental tests of that design. We merge the better features of two extant but very different auction processes, the Simultaneous Multiple Round (SMR) design used by the FCC to auction the electromagnetic spectrum and the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) of Banks et al. (1989, “Allocat...

Joint radar and communication (JRC) is a promising technique for spectrum re-utilization, which enables sensing data transmission to operate on the same frequencies devices. However, due multi-objective property of JRC systems, channel allocation nodes should be carefully designed maximize system performance. Additionally, because broadcast nature wireless signals, watchful adversary, i.e., war...

This paper considers bidder behaviour in the United Kingdom’s UMTS spectrum auction. Evidence is reviewed which shows that some bidders in this auction did not bid straightforwardly in accordance with fixed valuations of the licenses. We go on to consider more speculative hypotheses about bidders’ behaviour, such as the hypotheses that bidders revised their valuations in the light of other bidd...