It is acknowledged that one of the most critical issues facing today’s organizations concerns the substantial leaps required to methodologically structure innovation. Among other published work, some suggest that a complete rethinking of current practices is required. In this article, we propose a methodology aiming at providing controlled R&D choices based on a monitoring of the impact Solutio...

In experiments it is typically found that many joint utility outcomes arise in any given unstructured bargaining game. This suggests using a positive unstructured bargaining concept that maps a bargaining game to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than to a single outcome. We show how to “translate” Nash’s bargaining axioms to apply to such distributional bargaining concepts. We th...

In numerous economic scenarios, contracting parties may not have a clear picture of all the relevant aspects. A contracting party may be unaware of what she and/or others are entitled to determine. Therefore, she may reject a contract that is too good to be true. Further, a contracting party may actively exert cognitive effort before signing a contract, so as to avoid being trapped into the con...

Political science and economic science … make use of the same language, the same mode of abstraction, the same instruments of thought and the same method of reasoning (Black 1998, p. 354). Economics imperialism refers to the application of (mainstream) economic methods to the study of phenomena outside the traditional domain of economics. Uskali Mäki (forthcoming) has recently presented a typol...

This is a survey on recent progress in the understanding of some profound issues concerning the relation between onand off-shell concepts in local quantum physics. Proofs for special situations have already appeared in previous publications. This present frame build on modular localization is wide enough to cover such disparate looking issues as d=1+1 factorizing theories, holographic images of...

The problem of finding the k most critical nodes, referred to as the top-k problem, is a very important one in several contexts such as information diffusion and preference aggregation in social networks, clustering of data points, etc. It has been observed in the literature that the value allotted to a node by most of the popular cooperative game theoretic solution concepts, acts as a good mea...

We consider a simple model of cooperation among agents called Coalitional Skill Games (CSGs). This is a restricted form of coalitional games, where each agent has a set of skills that are required to complete various tasks. Each task requires a set of skills in order to be completed, and a coalition can accomplish the task only if the coalition’s agents cover the set of required skills for the ...

Characterizations of Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and rationalizability in terms of common knowledge of rationality are well known [Aumann 1987; Brandenburger and Dekel 1987]. We show how to get analogous characterizations of sequential equilibrium and (trembling hand) perfect equilibrium, as a consequence of recent results of Halpern [2009]. Arguably the major goal of epistemic ga...

These are notes for the first five lectures of the course on Algorithmic Game Theory, given (starting November 2008) in the Weizmann Institute jointly by Uriel Feige, Robert Krauthgamer and Moni Naor. The lecture notes are not intended to provide a comprehensive view of solution concepts in game theory, but rather discuss some of the algorithmic aspects involved. Hence some of the definitions w...