Sobel claims to disagree with many of the points made in my paper. He also claims that much if not all of what I say is already in the statistical treatment effect literature. He treats my Section 4 as a literature review rather than an illustration of the basic principles made in Sections 1–3 of the paper, as I intended it to be. In joint work with Edward Vytlacil, I present a comprehensive li...

ion and Performance from Explicit Monadic Re ection Jonathan Sobel Erik Hilsdale R. Kent Dybvig Daniel P. Friedman Department of Computer Science

This paper analyzes communication with a language that is vague in the sense that identical messages do not always result in identical interpretations. It is shown that strategic agents frequently add to this vagueness by being intentionally vague, i.e. they deliberately choose less precise messages than they have to among the ones available to them in equilibrium. Having to communicate with a ...

Bargaining, Strategic Reserves, and International Trade in Exhaustible Resources Author(s): Vincent P. Crawford, Joel Sobel and Ichiro Takahashi Reviewed work(s): Source: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Nov., 1984), pp. 472-480 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1...

There are several edge detection methodologies can be found in many image processing publications. But a single edge detection method is not enough to perform well in every possible image context. The purposed method describes a new framework which allows us to quantitatively combine the methods of different edge detection operators in order to provide improved results for edge detection of an ...

This paper revisits the Crawford-Sobel game by allowing the sender to choose her information structure endogenously before communicating with the receiver. Information acquisition here is costly, flexible and unobservable. First, I show under a general setup that the sender necessarily communicates all her information to the receiver in any equilibrium; and the sender’s incentive constraint at ...

Consider a group of individuals with unobservable perspectives (subjective prior beliefs) about a sequence of states. In each period, each individual receives private information about the current state and forms an opinion (a posterior belief). She also chooses a target individual and observes the target’s opinion. This choice involves a trade-off between well-informed targets, whose signals a...

This paper studies a new coordination game, the Language Game, of a large but finite population. The population is partitioned into two groups of identical agents. Each player shares a common two-action strategy set and interacts pairwise with everyone else. Both symmetric profiles are pareto-efficient strict equilibria, but the groups rank them differently. The profile where successful coordin...

In this paper we extend a method that uses image patch histograms and discriminative training to recognize objects in cluttered scenes. The method generalizes and performs well for different tasks, e.g. for radiograph recognition and recognition of objects in cluttered scenes. Here, we further investigate this approach and propose several extensions. Most importantly, the method is substantiall...

There are typically multiple equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford-Sobel (CS) model of strategic information transmission. This note identifies a simple condition on equilibrium payoffs, called NITS, that selects among CS equilibria. Under a commonly used regularity condition, only the equilibrium with the maximal number of induced actions satisfies NITS. We discuss various justifications for NI...