This paper examines the optimal mix and priority structure of bank and market debt using a tax shield-bankruptcy cost tradeoff model where the only unique feature of banks is their ability to renegotiate. Closed-form expressions are derived for the values of renegotiable bank debt, non-renegotiable market debt, equity, and levered firm values. Optimal debt structure hinges upon ex post bargaini...

This paper presents a model of shadow banking in which the shadow and the traditional banking systems share a symbiotic relationship. The analysis shows that competition with an opaque and fragile shadow bank can bene…t the traditional bank, especially when the traditional bank faces liquidity risk stemming from collective actions by investors, such as runs. The opacity and fragility of the sha...

We study experimental coordination games to examine through which transmission channels, and under which information conditions, a panic-based depositor-run at one bank may trigger a panic-based depositor-run at another bank. We find that withdrawals at one bank trigger withdrawals at another bank by increasing players’ beliefs that other depositors in their own bank will withdraw, making them ...

this paper tries to evaluate the nature of open market operation in the conventional banking system and to compare the usage of government securities and central bank securities for conducting this operation. in addition, the experience of the iranian central bank in using central bank musharakah certificates is reviewed. the main results of the paper, derived from an analytical- descriptive ap...

In order to protect the public's confidence in deposit money, governments usually guarantee bank deposits implicitly or through an explicit deposit insurance system. Thus bank insolvency does not induce immediate bank runs. In many episodes of banking crises, several years passed quietly after bank insolvency had occurred, with the insolvency continuing to develop under the surface, and the ras...