• For a 52-bed unit using safety syringes, the move to a passive-safety pen device would result in total estimated cost savings of $22,762 annually. EXAMINING THE ROLE OF INSULIN PEN DEVICES IN ACUTE CARE SETTINGS: A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF HEALTH RESOURCE UTILIZATION Smallwood, C. M.Sc.1, Lamarche, D. R.N. MSc N, CDE, CMSN(c).2, Chevrier, A. R.N., MSc(A), CMSN(c).2 1Health Economics and Outcome...

Coordinating activities at different sites of a multi-agentsystem typically imposes epistemic constraints on the par-ticipants. Specifying explicit bounds on the relative timesat which actions are performed induces combined tempo-ral and epistemic constraints on when agents can performtheir actions. This paper characterises the interactive epis-temic state that arises wh...

This paper discusses the motivation behind common knowledge. Common knowledge has been argued to be necessary for joint action in general and for language use as a particular kind of joint action. However, this term has been broadly interpreted. Two major issues must be addressed: (1) What mental state corresponds to common knowledge, i.e., is knowledge, belief or supposition the appropriate me...

We show that asynchronous collaboration can be made more effective by providing cues to common knowledge. We demonstrate this by empirically comparing two user interfaces used to support collaborative work. Our position is that effective collaboration is characterized by more co-ordinated and speculative interaction, and that cues to common knowledge help participants develop common ground for ...

Justification logics are epistemic logics that explicitly include justifications for the agents’ knowledge. We develop a multi-agent justification logic with evidence terms for individual agents as well as for common knowledge. We define a Kripke-style semantics that is similar to Fitting’s semantics for the Logic of Proofs LP. We show the soundness, completeness, and finite model property of o...

The most interesting economic environments involve more than one agent. In such situations agents must think not only about what they know, but also about what the others know. Nobody can buy stock unless somebody else is selling it. If the buyer has information suggesting the price will go up, perhaps he should consider that the seller might have information indicating that the price will go d...

This paper investigates the epistemic assumptions that David Lewis makes in his account of social conventions. In particular, I focus on the assumption that the agents have common knowledge of the convention to which they are parties. While evolutionary analyses show that the common knowledge assumption is unnecessary in certain classes of games, Lewis’ original account (and, more recently, Cub...

We consider the common-knowledge paradox raised in [HM90]: common knowledge is necessary for coordination, but common knowledge is unattainable in the real world because of temporal imprecision. We discuss two solutions to this paradox: (1) modeling the world with a coarser granularity, and (2) relaxing the requirements for coordination.

Common knowledge of intentions is crucial to basic social tasks ranging from cooperative hunting to oligopoly collusion, riots, revolutions, and the evolution of social norms and human culture. Yet little is known about how common knowledge leaves a trace on the dynamics of a social network. Here we show how an individual’s network properties—primarily local clustering and betweenness centralit...