The purpose of this paper is to address the strategic and tactic issues in agent communication. Strategic reasoning enables agents to decide about the global communication plan in terms of the macroactions to perform in order to achieve the main conversational goal. Tactic reasoning, on the other hand, allows agents to locally select, at each moment, the most appropriate argument according to t...

In agent theory and agent programming, goals constitute the motivational attitude of rational agents and form the key concept in explaining and generating their pro-active behavior. Pursuing multiple goals simultaneously might pose problems for agents as the plans for achieving them may conflict. We argue that a BDI-based agent programming language should provide constructs to allow an agent pr...

Many day-to-day tasks require negotiation, mostly under conditions of incomplete information. In particular, the opponent’s exact tradeoff between different offers is usually unknown. We propose a model of an automated negotiation agent capable of negotiating with a bounded rational agent (and in particular, against humans) under conditions of incomplete information. Although we test our agent ...

Rationality is a useful metaphor for understanding autonomous , intelligent agents. A persuasive view of intelligent agents uses cog-nitive primitives such as intentions and beliefs to describe, explain, and specify their behavior. These primitives are often associated with a notion of commitment that is internal to the given agent. However, at rst sight, there is a tension between commitments ...

This paper develops a rational expectations model with multiple equilibrium unemployment rates where the price of capital may be unbounded above. I argue that this property is an important feature of any rational-agent explanation of a financial crisis, since for the expansion phase of the crisis to be rational, investors must credibly believe that asset prices could keep increasing forever wit...

We consider schemes for obtaining truthful reports on a common but hidden signal from large groups of rational, self-interested agents. One example are online feedback mechanisms, where users provide observations about the quality of a product or service so that other users can have an accurate idea of what quality they can expect. However, (i) providing such feedback is costly, and (ii) there ...

Some work on modelling boundedly rational agents in organisations is described. It is then argued that social intelligence is not merely intelligence plus interaction but should allow for individual relationships to develop between agents. This means that, at least, agents must be able to distinguish, identify, model and address other agents, either individually or in groups; in other words tha...

In this paper we are interested in developing goal-based normative agent architectures. We ask ourselves the question what a normative goal is. To answer this question we introduce a qualitative normative decision theory based on belief (B) and obligation (O) rules. We show that every agent which makes optimal decisions – which we call a BO rational agent – acts as if it is maximizing the set o...

We study the relation between the trading behavior of agents and volatility in toy markets of adaptive inductively rational agents. We show that excess volatility, in such simplified markets, arises as a consequence of i) the neglect of market impact implicit in price taking behavior and of ii) excessive reactivity of agents. These issues are dealt with in detail in the simple case without publ...

The agents of my team are constructed of two layers; Reactive and Behavior Layer. Reactive Layer produces basic functions as an agent, that is, a world model, a perception and an actuator. Behavior Layer makes it easy for a designer to make a rational agent program. This paper especially foucuses on the Behavior Layer.