Deviant phenomenal knowledge is knowing what it’s like to have experiences of, e.g., red without actually having had experiences of red. Such a knower is a deviant. Some physicalists have argued and some anti-physicalists have denied that the possibility of deviants undermines anti-physicalism and the Knowledge Argument. The current paper presents new arguments defending the deviant-based attac...

The content of this paper contains four parts. (1) First, physicalism gives the enlightenments to behaviorism: mind-body identity, objectivity like physics and completeness of reduction. (2) Secondly, there are difficulties which behaviorist could not overcome—both the reduction of the theory and the terms are unreliable, and the strict distinction between introspective method and inter-subject...

Brian Loar believes he has refuted all those antiphysicalist arguments that take as their point of departure observations about what is or isn’t conceivable. I argue that there remains an important, popular and plausible-looking form of conceivability argument that Loar has entirely overlooked. Though he may not have realized it, Saul Kripke presents, or comes close to presenting, two fundament...

The “colored-brain thesis”, or strong qualitative physicalism, is discussed from historical and philosophical perspectives. This thesis was proposed by Thomas Case (1888), in a non-materialistic context, close to views explored H. Price (1932) E. Boring (1933). Using Mary’s room thought experiment, one can argue that physicalism implies physicalism. Qualitative involves three basic statements: ...