This paper proposes a method for determining the price bidding strategies of market participants consisting of Generation Companies (GENCOs) and Distribution Companies (DISCOs) in a day-ahead electricity market, while taking into consideration the load forecast uncertainty and demand response programs. The proposed algorithm tries to find a Pareto optimal point for a risk neutral participan...

Local electricity markets are a promising idea to foster the efficiency and use of renewable energy at distribution level. However, as such new concept, how these local will be designed integrated into existing market structures, make most profit from them, is still unclear. In this work, we propose mechanism in which end-users (consumers, small producers, prosumers) trade between peers. Due po...

iran achieved its self-sufficiency goal in wheat production a few years ago. some opponents argue that the increased wheat production has happened at the expense of decreasing other grains specially barley. considering the dependency of wheat and barley markets on each other, the study estimates policy preference functions for each market, separately. using weights according to the political in...

We develop an efficient algorithm for computing pure strategy Nash equilibria that satisfy various criteria (such as the utilitarian or Nash–Bernoulli social welfare functions) in games with sparse interaction structure. Our algorithm, called Valued Nash Propagation (VNP), integrates the optimisation problem of maximising a criterion with the constraint satisfaction problem of finding a game’s ...

We formulate a two-settlement equilibrium in competitive electricity markets as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in which each generation firm solves a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC), given other firms’ forward and spot strategies. We implement two computational approaches, one of which is based on a Penalty Interior Point Algorithm and the other is based on a steepe...

Motivated by the problems of unknown objectives in strategic bidding in the restructured electricity power markets where in practice, not all participants have full access to competitors’ information, this paper investigates a class of noncooperative -person games with unknown objectives with linear and cross terms in controls. We first formulate and explicitly derive the Nash equilibrium solut...

In the restructured environment of electricity market, firstly the generating companies and the customers are looking for maximizing their profit and secondly independent system operator is looking for the stability of the power network and maximizing social welfare. In this paper, a one way auction in the electricity market for the generator companies is considered in both perfect and imperfec...

Virtual bids were introduced in U.S. wholesale electricity markets to exploit arbitrage opportunities arising from expected price differences between day-ahead and real-time energy markets. These financial instruments have interactions with other elements of the electricity market design. For instance, virtual bids could affect day-ahead market-clearing prices so as to enhance the value of Fina...

The simultaneous multiple-round auction (SMRA) and the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) are the two primarymechanisms used to sell bandwidth. Under truthful bidding, the SMRA is known to output a Walrasian equilibrium that maximizes social welfare provided the bidder valuation functions satisfy the gross substitutes property [20]. Recently, it was shown that the combinatorial clock auction (CC...

It is known that Nash equilibria and approximate Nash equilibria not necessarily optimize social optima of bimatrix games. In this paper, we show that for every fixed ε > 0, every bimatrix game (with values in [0, 1]) has an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium with the total payoff of the players at least a constant factor, (1 − √ 1− ε), of the optimum. Furthermore, our result can be made algorithmi...