We study the strategic interaction between fundamental informed trading and order-flow informed trading. In a standard two-period Kyle (1985) model, we add a “back-runner” who observes, ex post and potentially with noise, the order flow of the fundamental informed investor in the first period. Learning from orderflow information, the back-runner competes with the fundamental investor in the sec...

We consider a dynamic asset pricing model with one asset, in which one informed trader trades against liquidity traders and competitive market makers. Informed trader has private information about the fundamental value of the asset as well as the exogenous demand shock on the market. We characterize the unique linear Markov equilibrium of the model. With just the private information about funda...

Empirical evidence suggests that information leakage in capital markets is common. We present a trading model to study the incentives of an informed trader (e.g., a well informed insider) to voluntarily leak information about an asset’s value to another independent trader. Our model shows that, while leaking information dissipates the insider’s information advantage about the asset’s value, it ...

What happens when uninformed investors trade stocks via mobile phones? Do they react to social sentiment differently than more informed traders in traditional trading? Based on 16,817 data observations and econometric analysis for the trading of 251 equities in Korea over 39 days, we present evidence of herding behavior among uninformed traders in the mobile channel. The results indicate that m...

The ease of Internet stock trading has lured relatively inexperienced investors into the financial markets. We study the consequences of the influx of these uninformed traders with a dynamic equilibrium framework. Our results show that these strategic uninformed online traders who adopt feedback strategies cannot outperform those who do not follow feedback strategies and that feedback trading c...

We examine how financial networks influence asset prices and trading performance. Consistent with theoretical studies on the role of communication networks in information dissemination, we posit that global financial institutions, having more extensive and strategic financial networks, can more efficiently acquire and process information pertaining to asset trading due to their better access to...

We study a simple model of an asset market with informed and non-informed agents. In the absence of non-informed agents, the market becomes information efficient when the number of traders with different private information is large enough. Upon introducing non-informed agents, we find that the latter contribute significantly to the trading activity if and only if the market is (nearly) informa...