This article is devoted to adverse selection problems in which individual private information is a whole utility function and cannot be reduced to some nite-dimensional parameter. In this case, incentive compatibility conditions can be conveniently expressed using some abstract convexity notions arising in Mass Transfer Theory 8]. After this characterization is provided, an existence result of ...

We revisit the problem of incentive-compatible interdomain routing, examining the quite realistic special case in which the utilities of autonomous systems (ASes) are linear functions of the traffic in the incident links and the traffic leaving each AS. We show that incentive-compatibility toward maximizing total welfare is achievable efficiently, and in the uncapacitated case, by an algorithm ...

This article studies the optimal prices and service quality grades that a queuing system---the ‘‘ firm”---provides to heterogeneous, utility-maximizing customers who measure quality by their experienced delay distributions. Results are threefold: First, delay cost curves are introduced that allow for a flexible description of a customer’s quality sensitivity. Second, a comprehensive executable ...

We study PAC learning in the presence of strategic manipulation, where data points may modify their features certain predefined ways order to receive a better outcome. show that vanilla ERM principle fails achieve any nontrivial guarantee this context. Instead, we propose an incentive-aware version which has asymptotically optimal sample complexity. then focus our attention on incentive-compati...

We develop a dynamic agency model in which the agent controls current earnings via short-term effort and firm growth via long-term effort and the firm is subject to both shortand long-run shocks. Under the optimal contract, agency conflicts can induce both overand underinvestment in shortand long-term efforts compared to first best, leading to shortor long-termism in corporate policies. Exposur...

A large literature on incentive mechanisms represents incentive constraints by the requirement that truthful reporting be a Bayesian equilibrium. This paper identifies mechanism design problems for which there is no loss in replacing Bayesian incentive compatibility by the stronger requirement of dominant strategies. We identify contexts where it is possible to change the transfer payments of a...

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ACKNOWLEDGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi 1.0 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2.0 ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF A BIDDING RING . . . . . . . . . 3 ...

Stable matchings have been studied extensively in social choice literature. The focus has mostly on integral matchings, which the nodes two sides are wholly matched. A fractional matching, is a convex combination of natural extension matchings. topic stability started receiving attention only very recently. Further, incentive compatibility context received little attention. With this as backdro...

A new approach to moral hazard is presented. Once local incentive compatibility is satisfied, the problem of verifying global incentive compatibility is shown to be isomorphic to the problem of comparing two classes of distribution functions. Thus, tools from choice under uncertainty can be brought to bear on the problem. The approach allows classic justifications of the first-order approach (F...