We review existing estimates of the size of the Spanish underground economy, apply the Ahumada et al. (2007, RIW) correction procedure to some of them and calculate the size of the underground economy in Spain for the period 1960 through 2009 by using the modified-cash-deposits-ratio (MCDR) approach recently developed by Pickhardt and Sardà (2011, EJLE). We then extend the MCDR approach with re...

We study how declared wealth responds to changes in tax rates. Exploiting rich intranational variation Switzerland, we find a 1 percentage point drop canton’s rate raises reported taxable by at least 43 percent after 6 years. Administrative records of two cantons with quasi-randomly assigned differential reforms suggest that 24 the effect arises from taxpayer mobility and 21 concurrent rise hou...

The aim of this paper is to analyze the shadow economy in the Spanish Autonomous Communities. In so doing, we employ the Currency Demand Approach to analyze the 1987–2010 period. The results show that the size of the shadow economy ranges from 18% to 30% of regional GDP and an approximate mean value of 25% for the entire territory. The Personal Income Tax has the greatest impact on the shadow e...

This paper analyzes the sources of heterogeneity in tax-minimizing strategies across individuals. We summarize insights obtained from the literature into three conditions affecting participation in tax minimization: namely, incentive, access, and awareness. Using a rich Swedish administrative panel data set on corporations, individuals, and active owners of closely held corporations, we analyze...

ABSTRACT We investigate the effects of mandatory private Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR) to European tax authorities on multinational firms' capital and labor investments, as well their organizational structures. exploit threshold-based application this 2016 disclosure rule conduct difference-in-differences regression discontinuity tests. document increases in expenditures Europe, but these...

This paper investigates the trade-offs between local elites and state agents as tax collectors in low-capacity states. We study a randomized policy experiment assigning neighborhoods of large Congolese city to property collection by chiefs or agents. Chief raised compliance 3.2 percentage points, increasing revenue 44 percent. Chiefs collected more bribes but did not undermine morale trust gove...