We investigate how personal characteristics affect people’s desire to collaborate and whether this attraction enhances or detracts from performance in venture capital. We find that venture capitalists who share the same ethnic, educational, or career background are more likely to syndicate with each other. This homophily reduces the probability of investment success, and the detrimental effect ...

This paper uses a novel empirical setting to explore the association between a firm’s operational risk, managerial monitoring costs, and the level of CEO equity incentives. We investigate a sample of supplier firms that rely on a few large customers for the bulk of their revenues. We predict that supplier firms with higher customer concentration face both higher exogenous idiosyncratic risk and...

We investigate how borrowers’ corporate governance influences bank loan contracting terms in emerging markets and how this relation varies across countries with different country-level governance. We find that borrowers with stronger corporate governance obtain favorable contracting terms with respect to loan amount, maturity, collateral requirements, and spread. Firm-level and country-level co...

Article history: Received 11 May 2012 Received in revised form 17 July 2013 Accepted 8 November 2013 Available online 18 November 2013 Market effects on corporate investment are well documented. Low disagreement implies high investment, but we know little about what high disagreement implies, other than the implied flip side (low investment). This paper adds to this literature in several ways. ...

The friction coefficients between the hoisting-rope and pads made of different materials under environmental conditions, load sizes, frequencies were investigated by using a wear tester. variation law coefficient with change in working condition parameters was explored through orthogonal test analysis; it is found that dry friction, 100 N, frequency 1 Hz are optimal conditions to achieve an mat...

This paper studies the e¤ect of social ties on governance. Social ties are per se neutral and merely act as incentive bridges that transmit incentives across individuals. Whether this improves or undermines governance depends on what incentives are transmitted. We demonstrate this in a delegated monitoring model where the supervisor is friends with the agent and cares about social recognition. ...

We study how organizational complexity affects managerial behavior, breaking it down into vertical hierarchy and degree of specialization. We exploit a novel dataset on the organizational structure of the US asset management industry. We show that more hierarchical structures reduce the incentive to collect soft information by investing less in closely-located firms. This reduces portfolio conc...

We examine firms that reprice their executive stock options and find little evidence that repricing reflects managerial entrenchment or ineffective governance. Repricing grants are economically significant, but there is little else unusual about compensation in repricing firms. Repricers tend to be smaller, younger, rapidly growing firms that experience a deep, sudden shock to growth and profit...

Previous studies have examined the manipulation of executive stock option awards and exercises, focusing on information timing by managers. In this paper, we investigate potential managerial manipulation of stock-price performance motivated by executive stock options. To distinguish performance manipulation from information timing, we examine stock-price performance surrounding the departure of...

In this paper, we introduce a new measure of personal ethics in the form of marital cheating to examine the relationship between personal ethics and corporate misconduct. Firms with CEOs and CFOs who use a marital infidelity website are more than twice as likely to engage in two forms of corporate misconduct. The relationship is not explained by a wide range of regional, firm, and executive cha...