نتایج جستجو برای: dispersed phase hold up
تعداد نتایج: 1534230 فیلتر نتایج به سال:
The influence of reactor pressure up to 6.0 MPa on the dynamic liquid hold-up in the trickle-flow regime with superficial gas velocities up to 5.2 cm/s has been investigated for water, ethanol and aqueous 40% ethyleneglycol, with nitrogen as the gas phase. Without gas flow, i.e. single-liquid trickle-flow operation, the reactor pressure has no influence on the dynamic liquid hold-up, which can ...
Firms in many high technology industries utilize and build on the innovations of others, often in the face of short product life cycles. Not surprisingly, the legal “rules of the game” governing intellectual property rights (such as patents) play a pivotal role in shaping this process of cumulative innovation by, among other things, affecting how the initial rights to technologies are allocated...
Firms in many industries build on the innovations of others, often in the face of short product life cycles. Not surprisingly, legal institutions governing intellectual property (IP) play a pivotal role in shaping this process of cumulative innovation. Recent studies suggest that IP-related “hold up” is especially problematic in the face of widely dispersed, or fragmented, markets for technolog...
This paper studies royalty negotiations between a patent holder and a downstream firm selling a product which is more valuable if it includes a feature covered by the patent. Royalties are negotiated in the shadow of patent litigation, which will determine whether or not the patent is valid and infringed. If the two firms negotiate after the downstream firm has already designed its product to i...
We propose a unified framework to study relational contracting and hold-up problems in infinite horizon stochastic games. We illustrate that with respect to long run decisions, the common formulation of relational contracts as Pareto-optimal public perfect equilibria is in stark contrast to fundamental assumptions of hold-up models. We develop a model in which relational contracts are repeatedl...
Most literature on the hold–up problem assumes that ex post bargaining outcomes are insensitive to prior investment costs. However, many bargaining procedures admit multiple equilibria and hence allow investment costs to affect bargaining outcomes. On the other hand, multiplicity of equilibria leaves scope for coordination failure. We report on three experiments in which unilateral investment i...
The paper examines the theoretical foundations of the hold–up problem. At a first stage, one agent decides on the level of a relationship– specific investment. There is no contract, so at a second stage the agent must bargain with a trading partner over the surplus that the investment has generated. We show that the conventional underinvestment result hinges crucially both on the assumed bargai...
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