In this paper we formulate a contract design problem where a primary license holder wishes to profit from its excess spectrum capacity by selling it to potential secondary users/buyers, but needs to determine how to optimally price it to maximize its profit, knowing that this excess capacity is stochastic in nature and cannot provide deterministic service guarantees to a buyer. We address this ...

We consider a situation where an agent’s effort is monitored by a supervisor who cares for the agent’s well–being. This is modeled by incorporating the agent’s utility into the utility function of the supervisor. The first–best solution can be implemented even if the supervisor’s preferences are unknown. The corresponding optimal contract is similar to what we observe in practice: The superviso...

The paper describes the design and implementation of an independent, third party contract monitoring service called Contract Compliance Checker (CCC). The CCC is provided with the specification of the contract in force, and is capable of observing and logging the relevant business-to-business (B2B) interaction events, in order to determine whether the actions of the business partners are consis...

This paper is based on a two-stage model of an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. We consider two cases in terms of strategic relevance between both firms. We also consider both price-setting competition and quantitysetting competition. Therefore, we examine four cases. Each case is correlated with a prior commitment that generates kinks in the reaction curve of the incumbent firm. We then...

The performance of staffs directly determines competitive power of enterprise in fierce market, and it also influences the long-term development of enterprise. If enterprise motivate employees only by virtue of economic contract, it cannot effectively assure staff performance, because psychological contract also affects employee’s work behavior and work attitude. This is especially notable in E...

We examine a model of dynamic screening and price discrimination in which the seller has limited commitment power. Two cohorts of anonymous, patient, and riskneutral buyers arrive over two periods. Buyers in the first cohort arrive in period one privately informed about the distribution of their values, and then privately learn the value realizations in period two. Buyers in the second cohort a...

This study examines the nature and role of psychological contract violation (PCV) in online marketplaces, a critical factor that has been largely overlooked by previous research. Applied to buyer-seller relationships, PCV is defined as a buyer’s perception of having being treated wrongly regarding the terms of an exchange agreement with an individual seller. PCV with individual sellers is propo...

A contract auction establishes a contract between a center and one of the bidders. As contracts may describe many terms, preferences over contracts typically display indifferences. The Qualitative Vickrey Auction (QVA) selects the best contract for the winner that is at least as good for the center as any of the contracts offered by the non-winning players. When each bidder can always offer a c...

This study examined the mentoring relationship as a context for the development of psychological contracts and investigated the obligations that mentors and protégés feel that they owe and are owed in the mentoring relationship. By using psychological contract theory, we develop new insights into the dynamics of the mentoring relationship and extend psychological contract research by applying t...

Existing work on privacy by design mostly focus on technologies rather than methodologies and on components rather than architectures. In this paper, we advocate the idea that privacy by design should also be addressed at the architectural level and be associated with suitable methodologies. Among other benefits, architectural descriptions enable a more systematic exploration of the design spac...