Sellers often have the power to censor reviews of their products. We explore effect these censorship policies in markets where some consumers are unaware possible censorship. find that if share such “naïve” is not too large, then rational treat any bad review revealed equilibrium as good news about product quality. This makes worth revealing and allows seller use them signal his product’s quali...

this paper aims to estimate a model of demand for health insurance and medical care in iran in the presence of the heterogeneous and latent health status of individual; moreover it tests the asymmetry of information in the health insurance industry of iran. our dataset consists of whole family budget survey of 2006. the parameters of model are estimated by g.m.m method and the model used in thi...

We study how to design an optimal government loan program for risky R&D projects with positive externalities. With adverse selection, the contract involves a high interest rate but nearly zero cofinancing by entrepreneur. This contrasts sharply observed schemes. selection and moral hazard, allowing two levels of effort entrepreneur, policy consists menu at most contracts, one self-financing...

Justified communication equilibrium (JCE) is an refinement for signaling games with cheap-talk communication. A strategy profile must be a JCE to stable outcome of nonequilibrium learning when receivers are initially trusting and senders play many more times than receivers. In the model, counterfactual “speeches” that have been informally used motivate past refinements messages actually sent. S...

ABSTRACT We study the impact of asymmetric (i.e., conservative or aggressive) disclosure on a firm’s price in classic setting which its stock is traded by risk-averse investors and noise liquidity traders. show that accounting policies alter relative risk faced when they short versus long, causes market to differ for positive negative demand shocks. As result, conservatism raises firms’ valuati...

Commonly used instruments for the identification of monetary policy disturbances are likely to combine true shock with information about state economy due disclosed through action. We show that this signaling effect can give rise empirical puzzles reported in literature, and propose a new high-frequency instrument shocks accounts informational rigidities. find tightening is unequivocally contra...

We compare contrarian to conformist advice, a expert being one whose preference bias is against the decision-maker’s prior optimal decision. Optimality of an depends on characteristics information and learning. If either fully informed or fine can be acquired cheaply, then for symmetric distributions F state, (contrarian) superior if single peaked (bimodal). only coarse acquired, acquires more ...

Several recent papers have proposed recursive Lagrangian-basedmethods for solving dynamic contracting problems. Thesemethods give rise to Bellman operators that incorporate either a dual inf-sup or a saddle point operation. We give conditions that ensure the Bellman operator implied by a dual recursive formulation is contractive. JEL codes: C61, C73, D82, E61.

We study optimal auctions when contacting prospective bidders is costly and the bidders’ values are correlated. Although full surplus extraction is in general impossible, we can construct a search mechanism that fully extracts the surplus with an arbitrarily high probability. JEL Classification: D44, D82, D83

This paper considers incomplete information games with payoffs subject to correlated random disturbances. It explains the connection between the uniqueness of quantal response equilibria, where large noise is required, and the uniqueness of equilibria in global games, where small noise is required. JEL classifications: C72, D82.