Abstract We study pillage games (Jordan in J Econ Theory 131(1):26–44, 2006), which model unstructured power contests. To enable empirical tests of game theory, we relax a symmetry assumption that agents’ intrinsic contributions to coalition’s is identical. characterise the core for all n . In three-agent game: (i) only eight configurations are possible core, contains at most six allocations; (...

This paper presents solutions to Density Classification Task (DCT) using a variant of Cellular Automata (CA) called Programmable Cellular Automata (PCA). The translation property as well as the density preserving property of fundamental CA rules in 1D and 2D, and the advantage of PCA are embedded together to obtain the DCT solution. The advantage of PCA over standard CA is reported. A general 2...

In the area of legislative choice, social choice theorists have focused on the equilibrium properties of pure majority rule (PMR), operating according to the implicit belief that whatever is true about the PMR mechanism also applies to institutions based upon it. This view has encouraged the study of what seemed to be the general case, thereby avoiding the narrower study of special cases such a...