I argue in this essay that Richard Swinburne’s revised version of Descartes’ argument chapter 5 his Are We Bodies or Souls? does not quite get him to the conclusion he requires, but a modified treatment personal identity will do trick. also look critically at against epiphenomenalism, where, once again, share have reservations about argument.

Wave-particle dualism is at the very heart of quantum mechanics. It manifests itself mostprominently in the double-slit experiment that has given rise to a fascinating discussion of “which-slit” information versus interference. In the present talk we analyze [1,2] two recent experiments[3,4] reporting simultaneous observation of “which-slit” and interference. Moreover, we introd...

The case for “analytical dualism” as a means of approaching sociotechnical action is presented as an alternative to accounts which tend to conflate agency, structure, and technology. This is based on the work of Margaret Archer, whose work is in turn located in the traditions of critical realism. Her commitment to analytical dualism, which stresses both the importance of time in analysis and th...

Does the exclusion argument put any pressure on dualism? Christian List and Daniel Stoljar August-October 2014 Abstract: The exclusion argument is widely thought to put considerable pressure on dualism if not to refute it outright. We argue to the contrary that, whether or not their position is ultimately true, dualists have a plausible response. The response focuses on the notion of ‘distinctn...

This paper unifies and extends the recent axiomatic literature on minimax regret. It compares several models of minimax regret, shows how to characterize the according choice correspondences in a unified setting, extends one of them to choice from convex (through randomization) sets, and connects them by defining a behavioral notion of perceived ambiguity. Substantively, a main idea is to behav...

I have argued in a number of writings that the philosophical part (though not the neurobiological part) of the traditional mind-body problem has a fairly simple and obvious solution: All of our mental phenomena are caused by lower level neuronal processes in the brain and are themselves realized in the brain as higher level, or system, features. The form of causation is “bottom up,” whereby the...

this paper argues that we will never get rid of the extremist mentality unless the dualist view prevails and is taught as part of the educational system. the dualist view takes account of both sides of an argument whereas the extremist view promotes one side unequivocally without considering the merits of the opposing view. the merits of the dualist view can be taught in schools so that everyon...