Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions extend and generalise all the preceding types of combinatorial auctions. In this paper, we try to make headway on the practical application of MMUCAs by: (1) providing an algorithm to generate artificial data that is representative of the sort of scenarios a winner determination algorithm is likely to encounter; and (2) subsequently assessing the performa...

When attempting to design a truthful mechanism for a computationally hard problem such as combinatorial auctions, one is faced with the problem that most efficiently computable heuristics can not be embedded in any truthful mechanism (e.g. VCG-like payment rules will not ensure truthfulness). We develop a set of techniques that allow constructing efficiently computable truthful mechanisms for c...

Market-based mechanisms such as auctions are being studied as an appropriate means for resource allocation in distributed and multiagent decision problems. When agents value resources in combination rather than in isolation, one generally relies on combinatorial auctions where agents bid for resource bundles, or simultaneous auctions for all resources. We develop a different model, where agents...

Reverse Combinatorial auctions, that is, auctions where bidders can bid on the supply right of combinations of items, tend to lead to more efficient allocations than traditional auction mechanisms in multi-item auctions where the agents' valuations of the items are not additive. A common model is formulated for optimal the winner determination problem of reverse combinatorial auction. A PRIM (P...

Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions offer a high potential to be employed for the automated assembly of supply chains of agents offering goods and services. Their winner determination problem is an NP-hard problem that can be mapped into an integer program. Nonetheless, the computational cost of the current solution hinders the application of mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions to reali...

Combinatorial auctions allow for more expressive bidding in which participants can submit package bids with logical constraints that limit allowable outcomes. This type of auction can be useful when participants' values are complementary or when participants have production and financial constraints. However, combinatorial auctions are currently rare in practice. The main problems confronted in...

Auction mechanisms have attracted a great deal of interest and have been used in diverse emarketplaces. In particular, combinatorial auctions have the potential to play an important role in electronic transactions. Therefore, diverse combinatorial auction market types have been proposed to satisfy market needs. These combinatorial auction types have diverse market characteristics, which require...

A combinatorial auction (CA) is an auction where bidders can buy (or sell) entire bundles of goods in a single transaction. Although computationally very complex, selling items in bundles has the great advantage of eliminating the risk for a bidder of not being able to obtain complementary items at a reasonable price in a follow-up auction (think of a combinatorial auction for a pair of shoes, ...

In the past two decades, telecommunications has turned into a highly competitive industry where companies are competing to buy valuable spectrum. Following the successful Personal Communications Services (PCS) Auction conducted by the US Federal Communications Commission in 1994, auctions have replaced traditional ways of allocating valuable radio spectrum such as comparative hearings (sometime...