Algorithmic collusion is an emerging concept. Whether algorithmic collusion is a creditable threat remains as an argument. In this paper, we propose an algorithm which can extort its human rival to collude in a Cournot duopoly competing market. In experiments, we show that, the algorithm can successfully extort its human rival and gets higher profit in long-run, meanwhile the human rival will f...

Collusion among bidders in auctions is a serious concern for those interested in designing allocation procedures to allocate public assets whether the goal of the process is efficiency or revenue maximization. In either case, bidders acting collusively can seriously impair an auctioneer’s ability to accomplish their goal. There have been a wide variety of examples of collusion discussed in the ...

Collusion-resistant fingerprinting paradigm seems to be a practical solution to the piracy problem as it allows media owners to detect any unauthorized copy and trace it back to the dishonest users. Despite the billionaire losses in the music industry, most of the collusion-resistant fingerprinting systems are devoted to digital images and very few to audio signals. In this paper, state-of-the-...

We investigate TU-game solutions that are neutral to collusive agreements among players. A collusive agreement binds collusion members to act as a single player and are feasible when they are connected on a network. Collusion neutrality requires that no feasible collusive agreement can change the total payoff of collusion members. We show that on the domain of network games, there is a solution...

This paper considers the question of tacit collusion in repeated auctions with independent private values and with limited public monitoring. McAfee and McMillan show that the extent of collusion is tied to availability of transfers. Monetary transfers allow cartels to extract full surplus. A folk theorem proved by Fudenberg at al. shows that transfers of future payoffs are almost as good if pl...

We investigate optimal managerial contracts in a principal-manager-employee hierarchy with a moral hazard problem at the bottom. We allow for collusion and extortion. Side contracting between manager and employee takes place before the employee has taken his action. Information is soft under collusion. If the manager's sole duty is to report information and if we focus on collusion plus extorti...

The purpose of this paper is to study the kind of e‰cient allocations that can be achieved in exchange economies with asymmetric information, by means of a decentralized mechanism robust to coalitional, strategic deviations. To this end, we define a new strategic equilibrium concept – called strong collusion-proof contract – designed to characterize stable communication agreements in games with...

A novel pre-warping technique for 3D meshes is presented to prevent collusion attacks on fingerprinted 3D models. By extending a similar technique originally proposed for still images, the surface of watermarked 3D meshes is randomly and imperceptibly pre-distorted to protect embedded fingerprints against collusion attacks. The peculiar problems set by the 3D nature of the data are investigated...

We study mergers in a duopoly with differentiated products and noisy observations of firms’ actions. Firms select dynamically optimal actions that are not static best responses and merger incentives arise endogenously when firms sufficiently deviate from their collusive actions. The incentive to merge trades off the gains from avoiding price wars against the gains from a monopoly net of the fix...

Reputation management systems are in wide-spread use to regulate collaborations in cooperative systems. Collusion is one of the most destructive malicious behaviors in which colluders seek to affect a reputation management system in an unfair manner. Many reputation systems are vulnerable to collusion, and some model-specific mitigation methods are proposed to combat collusion. Detection of col...