Coalition stability is a major requirement in coalition formation. One important problem to achieve stability in n-person game theories is the assumption that the preference of each buyer is publicly known. The coalition is said to be stable if there are no objection by any subset of buyers according to their publicly known preferences. However, such assumption is often unrealistic in typical r...

The combination of participating organizations in a coalition operation often changes over time; the coalition is dynamic and evolves over the course of its mission. A given organization may participate in the coalition only at the stage where its expertise or resources are most needed, while other organizations may participate through the entire course of the operation. As these are independen...

tuberculosis of the foot is an uncommon entity and the reported incidence is 0.1% to 0.3%. the isolated tuberculosis of talonavicular joint is exceptionally rare. in tuberculosis of the foot and ankle, the presentation is usually nonspecific. the diagnosis of tuberculosis affecting foot is difficult, especially when it is isolated. in doubtful cases, diagnosis should be confirmed by histopathol...

The mechanism by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) for non-transferable utility (NTU) games is generalized so that a coalition structure among players is taken into account. The new mechanism yields the Owen value for transferable utility (TU) games with coalition structure as well as the consistent value (Maschler and Owen 1989, 1992) for NTU games with trivial coalition structure. Furthermore, we ob...

• Appreciation of a coalition depends respectively on the most preferred and least preferred subcoalition(s). ‣ Preferences satisfy top responsiveness if the following conditions hold: i) each coalition contains a unique most preferred subcoalition (called a choice set); ii) appreciation of a coalition depends on the choice set; iii) if two coalitions have the same choice set, then the smaller ...

In this paper, we introduce a component efficient value for TU games with a coalition structure which reflects the outside options of players within the same structural coalition. It is based on the idea that splitting a coalition should affect players who stay together in the same way. We show that for all TU games there is a coalition structure that is stable with respect to this value. Journ...

Coordination and cooperation of artificial autonomous agents is activity for effective problems solution. Coalition formation is by one of cooperative mechanisms used in multi-agent systems. Various approaches of multi-agent coalition formation ensure coalition stability, optimal allocation of sources and payoff distribution for efficient achievement of individual or collective goals. The paper...

The Shapley value is defined as the average marginal contribution of a player, taken over all possible ways to form the grand coalition N when one starts from the empty coalition and adds players one by one. In a previous paper, the authors have introduced an allocation scheme for a general model of coalition formation where the evolution of the coalition of active players is ruled by a Markov ...

We consider optimizing the coalition structure in Coalitional Skill Games (CSGs), a succinct representation of coalitional games (Bachrach and Rosenschein 2008). In CSGs, the value of a coalition depends on the tasks its members can achieve. The tasks require various skills to complete them, and agents may have different skill sets. The optimal coalition structure is a partition of the agents t...

The purpose of this article is to analyze a class of voting games in a partition approach. We consider a society in which coalitions can be formed and where a finite number of voters have to choose among a set of alternatives. A coalition is winning if it can veto any proposed alternative. In our model, the veto power of a coalition is dependent on the coalition formation of the outsiders. We s...