In this paper we present a generalization of power indices which includes the preferences of the voters. Using a Multilinear Extension perspective (Owen, 1972a) we measure the probability of the players’ voting ’yes’ for a particular political issue. Further, we randomize the issues and show the influence that the Agenda Setter can have on a player’s power. We demonstrate these results using da...

We present a classification of all stationary subgame perfect equilibria of the random proposer model for a three-person cooperative game according to the level of efficiency. The efficiency level is characterized by the number of “central” players who join all equilibrium coalitions. The existence of a central player guarantees asymptotic efficiency. The marginal contributions of players to th...

Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its realizations, one can overcome this shortcoming. We even show that such correspondences satisfy a str...

Using techniques from the non-standard analysis, a non-standard analogue of the AumannShapley random order value of non-atomic games is provided. The paper introduces the notion of effectively ergodic family of automorphism groups. It is shown that for a wide class of games, the non-standard random order value with respect to an effectively ergodic family of automorphism groups coincides with t...

Members of a shareholder meeting or legislative committee have greater or smaller voting power than meets the eye if the nucleolus of the induced majority game di ers from the voting weight distribution. We establish a new su cient condition for the weight and power distributions to be equal; and we characterize the limit behavior of the nucleolus in case all relative weights become small. JEL ...

In this paper, we introduce a component efficient value for TU games with a coalition structure which reflects the outside options of players within the same structural coalition. It is based on the idea that splitting a coalition should affect players who stay together in the same way. We show that for all TU games there is a coalition structure that is stable with respect to this value. Journ...

The Myerson value is an allocation rule which assigns a vector of payoffs to a collection of conferences. It treats direct and indirect connections of players in conferences equally, and thus assigns the same vector of payoffs to a large class of collections of conferences. This paper proposes and axiomatizes an allocation rule which distinguishes direct connections from indirect ones, and henc...

We study sequential bargaining in many-to-one matching markets. We show that there is an advantage to entering late in the market, and that the last agent to enter the market will receive his or her best partner in a stable matching, extending the results of Blum and Rothblum (2002) and Cechlárová (2002) for the marriage model. We also discuss the relation between sequential bargaining and a po...

We consider economies with many agents and compare the competitive equilibria and the value allocations of the resultingcoalitional games. In particular, we provide a (smooth and robust) example where the “value principle” does not hold for the HarsanyiNTU-value: there is a unique competitive equilibrium,which however does notbelong tothe (nonempty) set of Harsanyi value allocations. Journal of...

In general partition function form games, the recursive core coalition structure may be either coarser or finer than the one that maximizes the social surplus. Moreover, the recursive core structure is typically different from the one predicted by the α-core. We fully implement the recursive core for general games, including non-superadditive games where the grand coalition does not form in equ...