The solution is given here for the infinitely repeated two-person zero-sum,games of inr complete information characterized by 2 X 2 games, with information matrxces b for the ftrst game and( b ab)for the second game.

We consider two populations co-evolving with fitness defined by the payoff in a two-person zero-sum game. We show that such situations lead to spontaneous and sustained oscillations iff the optimal strategy of the game is mixed.

The function that assigns to each matrix game (i.e., the mixed extension of a finite zero-sum two-player game) its value is axiomatized by a number of intuitive properties.

An open-loop two-person zero-sum linear quadratic (LQ for short) stochastic differential game is considered. The controls for both players are allowed to appear in both the drift and diffusion of the state equation, the weighting matrices in the payoff/cost functional are not assumed to be definite/nonsingular, and the cross-terms between two controls are allowed to appear. A forward-backward s...

In the previous lecture we saw that there always exists a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games. Moreover, the equilibrium enjoys several attractive properties such as polynomial-time tractability, convexity of the equilibrium set, and uniqueness of players’ payoffs in all equilibria. In the present and the following lecture we investigate whether simple and natural distributed protocol...

This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to address the problem of optimal sensor placement for detecting cyber-attacks in networked control systems. The is formulated as zero-sum game with two players, namely malicious adversary and detector. Given protected target vertex, detector places at single vertex monitor system detect presence adversary. On other hand, selects through which condu...