We demonstrate that in a CAPM economy Walras Law and the Tobin Separation Property characterize market demand on nite sets of prices. Consequently, for any number n there exist CAPM economies which have at least n equilibria and hence have n di erent beta pricing formulas. It is shown that the lower bound on the number of equilibria, n, is robust to pertubations of endowments.

Paul A. Samuelson’s (1966) capitulation with his Austrian model during the so-called Cambridge controversy on phenomenon of re-switching techniques in capital theory had implications not only pointing at supposed internal contradiction marginal production and distribution but also pursuit vested interests academic political world to this day. The present paper is aimed demonstrating that was lo...

In the incomplete markets model with numeraire asset and a single consumption good we show that, even with homothetic preferences, on compact sets of prices Continuity, Walras’ identity and Homogeneity characterize the properties of market excess demand. This result is proved by an extension of Mantel (1976) to the case of incomplete markets. Journal of Economic Literature Class. No. : D 52, C ...

It’s shown that a number of variational problems can be cast as finding the maxinf-points (or minsup-points) of bivariate functions, coveniently abbreviated to bifunctions. These variational problems include: linear and nonlinear complementarity problems, fixed points, variational inequalities, inclusions, non-cooperative games, Walras and Nash equilibrium problems. One can then appeal to the t...

We consider Cournot competition in general equilibrium. Decisions firms are taken by majority voting. Naturally, interests of voters—shareholders or stakeholders—depend on their endowments and portfolios. Indeed, voters every firm concerned about the return portfolios rather than shares firm. introduce two notions local Cournot–Walras equilibria to overcome difficulties arising from non-concavi...

Individuals exchange contracts for the delivery of commodities in competitive markets and, simultaneously, act strategically; actions affect utilities across individuals directly or through the payoffs of contracts. This encompasses economies with asymmetric information. Nash walras equilibria exist for large economies, even if utility functions are not quasi concave and choice sets are not con...