the impact of gender gap on voting behavior generally is categorized into the traditional gap, convergence and revisionist patterns. this paper, firstly by using survey research method and data were collected from 230 eligible male and female voters in isfahan, makes clear that the first pattern or the traditional gender gap is dominated in this electorate, which denotes that women are more con...

We present a formal model of political competition under approval voting which allows for endogenous candidate entry. Our analysis yields a number of novel insights. First, we develop a notion of sincere voting behavior under approval voting, called relative sincerity. We then show that the relatively sincere voting behavior is consistent with the strategic calculus of voting. Second, we show t...

This paper develops a unified approach to study participation and voting in multiple elections. The theoretical setting combines an “uncertain-voter” model of turnout with a spatial model of voting behavior. We apply our framework to the study of turnout and voting in U.S. presidential and congressional elections. We structurally estimate the model using individual-level data for the 2000 elect...

We study sequential voting with two alternatives, in a setting with utility externalities: as usual, each voter has a private preference over the candidates and likes her favorite candidate to win, but additionally, a voter values voting for the chosen winner (which is determined by the majority or super-majority of votes). This model aims to capture voting behavior (”likes”) in social networks...

We develop an analysis of voting rules that is robust in the sense that we do not make any assumption regarding voters’ knowledge about each other. In dominant strategy voting rules, voters’ behavior can be predicted uniquely without making any such assumption. However, on full domains, the only dominant strategy voting rules are random dictatorships. We show that the designer of a voting rule ...

The extent to which an electoral outcome is responsive to a voter 's preferences over outcomes depends on the voter 's ability to express her preferences in the act of voting. For instance, if a voter knows everything there is to know about the consequences of her voting decision, then her vote will be a relatively accurate measure of her preferences. In contrast, if a voter is uncertain about ...

We compare the behavior of voters under simultaneous and sequential voting rules when voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many political institutions, ranging from small committees to mass elections, voting is sequential, which allows some voters to know the choices of earlier voters. For a stylized model, we generate a variety of predictions about the relative e¢ ciency and part...