The paper extends a dynamic version of the classical von NeumannMorgenstern setting to incorporate a degree of confidence in or subjectivity of probabilistic beliefs. It provides a simple axiomatic characterization of a new preference representation that addresses ambiguity from a simple perspective, employing only basic tools from risk analysis. Conceptually, the paper renders the concept of s...

This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the finite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von Neumann-Morgestern solutions: assuming that players are patient, that the voting rule is oligarchical, and that there is at least one veto player with positive recognition probabil...

In this paper we say that a preference for freedom of choice is justifiable if there exists a reflexive and complete binary relation on the set of alternatives, such that one opportunity set is at least as good as a second, if and only if the there is at least one alternative from the first set which is no worse than any alternative of the two sets combined together, with respect to the binary ...

10 Most contemporary philosophical discussions of utility either follow the 11 utility representations of von Neumann and Morgenstern that use prob12 ability and the expectation principle to measure individual utilities in a 13 way that leaves zero point and unit undetermined, or assume that psy14 chology can ultimately deliver utility measurement on an absolute scale. 15 From the second point ...

One of the earliest solution concepts considered in game theory are saddle points, combinations of actions such that no player can gain by deviating (see, e.g., von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947). In two-player zero-sum games, every saddle point happens to coincide with the optimal outcome both players can guarantee in the worst case and thus enjoys a very strong normative foundation. Unfortuna...

The von Neumann and Morgenstern theory postulates that rational choice under uncertainty is equivalent to maximization of expected utility (EU). This view is mathematically appealing and natural because of the affine structure of the space of probability measures. Behavioural economists and psychologists, on the other hand, have demonstrated that humans consistently violate the EU postulate by ...

Two agents have to choose one of three alternatives. Their ordinal rankings of these alternatives are commonly known among them. The rankings are diametrically opposed to each other. Ex-ante efficiency requires that they reach a compromise, that is choose the alternative which they both rank second, if and only if the sum of their von Neumann Morgenstern utilities from this alternative exceeds ...