Abstract: Recently, common selection schemes used in harmony search algorithm (HSA) are altered in memory consideration operation to imitate the natural selection principle of survival of the fittest. The selection schemes adopted include: random, proportional, tournament, and linear rank. In this paper, these selection schemes are analysed in order to evaluate their effect on the performance o...

We present a game engine for general game playing based on UCT, a combination of Monte-Carlo and tree search. The resulting program is named ARY. Despite the modest number of random games played by ARY before choosing a move, it scored quite well in the qualifying phase of the annual general game playing tournament hosted by AAAI.

We prove that, with high probability, any 2-edge-colouring of a random tournament on n vertices contains a monochromatic path of length Ω(n/ √ log n). This resolves a conjecture of Ben-Eliezer, Krivelevich and Sudakov and implies a nearly tight upper bound on the oriented size Ramsey number of a directed path.

This note extends a recent result of Kannan, Tetali and Vempala to completely solve, via a simple proof, the problem of random generation of a labeled tournament with a given score vector. The proof uses the method of path coupling applied to an appropriate Markov chain on the set of labeled tournaments with the same score vector. MRS: 65C05, 05C20.

Abstract. Consider a randomly oriented graph G = (V, E) and let a, s and b be three distinct vertices in V . We study the correlation between the events {a → s} and {s → b}. We show that, when G is the complete graph Kn, the correlation is negative for n = 3, zero for n = 4, and that, counter-intuitively, it is positive for n ≥ 5. We also show that the correlation is always negative when G is a...

Computational Social Choice (ComSoc) is a rapidly developing field at the intersection of computer science, economics, social choice, and political science. The study of tournaments is fundamental to ComSoc and many results have been published about tournament solution sets and reasoning in tournaments [4]. Theoretical results in ComSoc tend to be worst case and tell us little about performance...

This paper analyzes a procurement setting with two identical firms and stochastic innovations. In contrast to the previous literature, I show that a procurer who cannot charge entry fees may prefer a fixed-prize tournament to a first-price auction since holding an auction may leave higher rents to firms when the innovation technology is subject to large random factors.

In Go and Hex, we examine the effect of a blunder — here, a random move — at various stages of a game. For each fixed move number, we run a self-play tournament to determine the expected blunder cost at that point.

This thesis consists of four self-contained essays that compare real-world incentive schemes used to mitigate moral hazard problems under non-verifiable performance. The first essay contrasts the impact of the precision of performance measurement on wage costs in Uand J-type tournaments. In U-type tournaments prizes are fixed. In J-type tournaments only an overall wage sum is specified. The pri...