We analyze the relation between strategy-proofness and preference reversal in case that agents may declare indifference. Interestingly, Berga Moreno (2020) have recently derived from group of social choice functions on strict preferences domains if range has no more than three elements. extend this result and, at same time, present a simple argument for proving it. Our analysis points out role ...

A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a pro…le of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not su¤er from congestion and are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of the class of rules satisfying Pareto-e¢ ciency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule...

Abstract We conduct laboratory experiments for the multi-unit Vickrey auction with and without advice to subjects on strategy-proofness. The rate of truth-telling among stays at 20%, whereas increases 47% those who have received advice. By conducting similar pay-your-bid auction, which is not strategy-proof, we confirm that increase in due significantly net effect (i.e., beyond so-called experi...

Merging operators aim at defining the beliefs/goals of a group of agents from the beliefs/goals of each member of the group. Whenever an agent of the group has preferences over the possible results of the merging process (i.e. the possible merged bases), she can try to rig the merging process by lying on her true beliefs/goals if this leads to a better merged base according to her point of view...