We show how opportunities for strategic manipulation in partial equilibrium can be analyzed using strategic versions of Marshallian supply and demand curves. With a …nite set of players on each side of the market, non-trivial Nash equilibria of games are in 1–1 correspondence with intersections of the strategic supply and demand curves. This equivalence can be used to derive a threshold conditi...

This paper examines the competitiveness of winner-take-all price competition in homogeneous product oligopoly environments where underlying buyer demands and/or firms’ costs need not be continuous. Our analysis is motivated by the observation that a variety of economic settings have these features. For example, in 1996 an Ivy League university solicited bids from several vendors for its initiat...

An experiment on dyadic distributive negotiation is presented that analyzes the role of the market price as a credible reference point in a bargain between a human buyer and a computerized seller implementing a contingent negotiation strategy. The market price had strong effects on the initial reservation and aspiration prices, and indirectly affected the settlement price and the number of nego...

We consider the so-called “optimal execution problem” in algorithmic trading, which is the problem faced by an investor who has a large number of stock shares to sell over a given time horizon and whose actions have impact on the stock price. In particular, we develop and study a price model that presents the stochastic dynamics of a geometric Brownian motion and incorporates a log-linear effec...

The paper examines the role of executive compensation in inducing management behavior that triggers private securities litigation. Incentive pay in the form of options is found to increase the probability of securities class action lawsuits, holding constant a wide range of other firm characteristics. In contrast, base pay levels and share ownership do not have a significant impact on lawsuit i...

We deal with the problem of providing incentives for the implementation of constrained optimal outcomes in a two-period economy with incomplete markets. Allowing both for price observation, price-manipulation and a minimal amount of coordination enables to recover (second-best) efficiency at equilibrium, therefore to do better than perfect competition. To make this point, we construct a feasibl...

According to static models of industrial organization, a rise in competition decreases prices. In this paper, I test whether this conclusion can be reversed in the mobile telecommunications markets where dynamic e ciency e ects might be signi cant. The empirical test relies on the change in the intensity of competition introduced by the entry of the fourth mobile operator in France and the merg...

A recent strategy carried out by the aircraft industry to reduce the total cost of the new generation fighters has consisted in the development of a single airframe with different technical and operational specifications. This strategy has been designed to reduce costs in the Research, Design and Development phase with the ultimate objective of reducing the final unit price per aircraft. This i...