In this paper we model the interaction between parties and candidates to highlight the mechanisms by which parties selecting candidates may discipline legislators. Parties are long-lived organizations providing incentives to short-lived candidates. The incentive problem parties face is very similar to the problem faced by firms that try to motivate workers. However parties are different from fi...

In line with previous studies, showing that abstract concepts like "power" or "god" implicitly activate spatial associations, in the present study we hypothesized that spatial associations are coactivated during the processing of acronyms referring to names of political parties as well. In four studies, it was found that the reading of these acronyms was accompanied by the implicit activation o...

INTRODUCTION The study focuses on the programmatic bases of Slovenian political parties since independence. It presents an analysis of party programs and their preferences regarding doctors and other health workers, as well as the contents most commonly related to them. At the same time, the study also highlights the intensity of the presence of doctors on the policy agenda through time. METH...

T research on political campaigns has focused on the positioning of parties and not on how parties communicate with the electorate. We construct a model where two parties fund both the “creative” and “media” elements of political advertising and examine how campaign budgets affect advertising strategies in the context of a political campaign. Our key finding is that tight campaign limits stimul...

Abstract We theoretically investigate how political abstention among certain social groups encourages populist parties to enter the stage, trying absorb inactive voters. design a two-stage game with two established and n voters who jointly determine taxation policy. The electorate is divided into groups, advantaged disadvantaged. Voters’ decisions on whether participate depend party’s tax rate ...

We study the recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by two political parties competing in an election. We show that political parties may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that they could select better individuals. Furthermore, we show that this phenomenon is more likely to occur i...