Sometimes when we describe our own sensory experiences, seem to attribute experience itself the same sorts of familiar properties—such as shape or colour—as everyday physical objects. But how literally should understand such descriptions? Can there really be phenomenal elements aspects an which are, for example quite square? This paper examines these questions connect a wide range different com...

1 Grasping Properties I will present an argument for property dualism. The argument employs a distinction between having a concept of a property and grasping a property via a concept. If you grasp a property P via a concept C, then C is a concept of P. But the reverse does not hold: you may have a concept of a property without grasping that property via any concept. If you grasp a property, the...

e topic of phenomenal consciousness concerns what it means for mental states to be conscious states (as opposed to unconscious mental states) and what it means for such states to have phenomenal character, that is, to have properties in virtue of which there is " something it's like " for a subject to be in such a state. Traditional philosophical issues that phenomenal consciousness raises invo...

There are both externalist and internalist theories of the phenomenal content of conscious experiences. Externalists like Dretske and Tye treat the phenomenal content of conscious states as representations of external properties (and events). Internalists think that phenomenal conscious states are reducible to electrochemical states of the brain in the style of the type-type identity theory. In...

Is a phenomenal pain a conscious primitive or composed of more primitive phenomenal states? Are pain experiences necessarily or only contingently unpleasant? Here, I sketch how to answer such questions concerning intra-phenomenal metaphysics using the example of pain and unpleasantness. Arguments for a symmetrical metaphysical independence of phenomenal pain and unpleasant affect are presented,...

Representationalism, the view that phenomenal character supervenes on intentional content, has attracted a wide following in recent years. Representationalism can take various forms. Most representationalists have offered a form of reductive representationalism, according to which phenomenal character is itself intentional content of a certain sort.1 Such views promise to reduce the ‘hard probl...

In this paper I respond to a family of objections seeking to show that the phenomenal concept strategy must fail. Roughly, the strategy holds that antiphysicalist arguments, such as Kripke’s modal argument and Jackson’s knowledge argument, can be undercut by appealing to the unique features of phenomenal concepts. This idea is cashed out in various ways by different philosophers, but the thread...

Few issues in psychology are as fundamental or as elusive as the sense of one’s own body. Despite widespread recognition of the link between body and self, psychology has only recently developed methods for the scientific study of bodily awareness. Experimental manipulations of embodiment in healthy volunteers have allowed for important advances in knowledge. Synchronous multisensory inputs fro...