Guilt and envy play an important role in social interaction. Guilt occurs when individuals cause harm to others or break social norms. Envy occurs when individuals compare themselves unfavorably to others and desire to benefit from the others’ advantage. In both cases, these emotions motivate people to act and change the status quo: following guilt, people try to make amends for the perceived t...

Abstract This paper explores the Arthashastra of Kaultilya, an ancient Indian literature (4 Century B.C.); and it’s perspectives on organizational management today. Chinmayananda (2003) asserted that from time to time there is a need to look and re-look at the ancient literatures and provide intelligent interpretation and re-interpretation to apply effectively in the context of modern managemen...

Many experiments have demonstrated that people are willing to incur cost to punish norm violators even when they are not directly harmed by the violation. Such altruistic third-party punishment is often considered an evolutionary underpinning of large-scale human cooperation. However, some scholars argue that previously demonstrated altruistic third-party punishment against fairness-norm violat...

Speakers of many languages tend to use pairs words such as emotion/feeling or jealousy/envy interchangeably. This paper explores the differences in way which emotional states jealousy and envy are understood (in Croa­tian language ljubomora zavist) influence culture on expression these states. First, we establish cultural framework that significantly shapes experience states, summarize cognitiv...

We show that an asymptotic envy-freeness is a necessary condition for a form of robust approximate implementation in large economies. We are grateful for financial support from the National Science Foundation under grant SES-9986190. We thank Andy Postlewaite for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Division of Humanities and Social Sciences 228-77, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena...

We formulate and study the requirement on an allocation rule that no agent should be able to benefit by augmenting his endowment through borrowing resources from the outside world (alternatively, by simply exaggerating it). We show that the Walrasian rule is not “borrowing-proof” even on standard domains. More seriously, no efficient selection from the endowments-lower-bound correspondence, or ...

We extend the classic cake-cutting problem to a situation in which the ”cake” is divided among families. Each piece of cake is owned and used simultaneously by all members of the family. A typical example of such a cake is land. We examine three ways to assess the fairness of such a division, based on the classic no-envy criterion: (a) Average envy-freeness means that for each family, the avera...

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents. Existing literature that focuses on the concept of envy inherently assumes that each agent can observe which goods the other agents are allocated before deciding if she envies them. In this paper, we propose a novel policy in which the principal hides from each agent the allocations made to the other agents. Each agent now a...